A27051:1017
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
II. By the Intellection of these, we conceive of other things as like them, forming Universal conceptions, and applying them to such individuals as are beyond the reach of our Senses. (As we think of Men, Trees, Beasts, Fishes, &c. in the Indies as like those which we have seen; and of sounds there as like those which we have heard, and of the taste of Fruits by the similitude of such as we have tasted, &c.
III. How Sense it self, Intellection it self, Volition it self, and internal Affections are perceived, is no small controversy ⟨p. 312⟩among Philosophers. That we do perceive them, (by the great wisdom and goodness of our Creator) we are sure; but how we do it we can scarce describe, as knowing it better by the experience of that perception it self than by a knowledge of the Causes and Nature of the acts. It is most commonly said that the Intellect knoweth its own acts by Reflection, or as Ockam, by Intuition, and that it knoweth what Sense is, and what Volition by some Species or Image of them in the fantasy which it beholdeth. But such words give no man a true knowledge of the thing enquired of, unless withal he read the solution experimentally in his own Soul. I know not what the meaning of a Reflect act is: Is it the same act which is called Direct and Reflect? And doth the Intellect know that it knoweth by the very same act by which it knoweth other things? If so, why is it called Reflect, and what is that reflection? But the contrary is commonly said, that divers objects make divers acts, and therefore to know e.g. that this is Paper, and to know that I know this, are two acts, and the latter is a reflecting of the former. But the former act is gone, and nothing in the instant that it is done, and therefore is in it self no intelligible object of a reflecting act: But as remembered it may be known, or rather that remembering is knowing what is past, by a marvellous retention of some impress of it which no man can well comprehend, so as to give an account of it: And why may not the same memory which retaineth the unexpressible Record of an Act past an hour or many years ago, be also the Book where the Intellect readeth its own Act as past immediately in the foregoing instant? But sure this is not the first knowing that we know? Before the act of memory, the Intellect immediately perceiveth its own particular acts: And so doth the sense: By one and the same act we see and perceive that we see; and by one and the same act (I think) we know and know that we know, and this by a consciousness or internal sense which is the immediate act