A27051:1019
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For the various senses of the word object must be considered in the decision of that: Mans Soul is Gods Image: When God knoweth himself and his own knowledge, and when he willeth or loveth himself, and his own will or love, here we must either say that himself, his knowledge and will is not properly to be called an Object, or else that the Object and the Act are purely the same, without the least real difference; but we name them differently as inadequate conceptions of one Being: And why may it not be so in a lower sort in the Soul that is Gods Image? That is, that the understandings most internal act, viz. the knowing or perceiving when it knoweth any thing that it knoweth. It is not really compounded of an act and an object (as the knowledge of distinct objects is;) but that either its act is not properly to be called its object, or that act and object are not two things, but two inadequate conceptions of one thing.
And how doth the Soul perceive its own Volitions? To say that Volitions which are acts of the Intellectual Soul must be sensate, and so make a Species on the fantasy, as sensate things do, and be known only in that Species, is to bring down the higher faculty, and subordinate it to the lower, that it may be intelligible; while it is certain that we shall never here perfectly understand the solution of these difficulties, is it not pardonable, among other mens conjectures, to say, That the noble faculty of Sense (because Brutes have it) is usually too basely described by Philosophers? And that Intellection and Volition in the rational Soul are a superior eminent sort of sensation transcending that of Brutes; and that Intelligere & Veil are eminenter sentire; and that the Intellect doth by understanding other things, eminently see or sense, and so understand that it understandeth: And ⟨p. 314⟩that the will doth by willing feel that it willeth: When I consult my Experience, I must either say thus, or else that Intellection and Volition so immediately ever move the Internal sense, that they are known by us only as acts compounded with that sense.