A27051:1020
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And how doth the Soul perceive its own Volitions? To say that Volitions which are acts of the Intellectual Soul must be sensate, and so make a Species on the fantasy, as sensate things do, and be known only in that Species, is to bring down the higher faculty, and subordinate it to the lower, that it may be intelligible; while it is certain that we shall never here perfectly understand the solution of these difficulties, is it not pardonable, among other mens conjectures, to say, That the noble faculty of Sense (because Brutes have it) is usually too basely described by Philosophers? And that Intellection and Volition in the rational Soul are a superior eminent sort of sensation transcending that of Brutes; and that Intelligere & Veil are eminenter sentire; and that the Intellect doth by understanding other things, eminently see or sense, and so understand that it understandeth: And ⟨p. 314⟩that the will doth by willing feel that it willeth: When I consult my Experience, I must either say thus, or else that Intellection and Volition so immediately ever move the Internal sense, that they are known by us only as acts compounded with that sense.
And how doth the Soul perceive its own Volitions? To say that Volitions which are acts of the Intellectual Soul must be sensate, and so make a Species on the phantasie, as sensate things do, and be known only in that Species, is to bring down the higher faculty, and subordinate it to the lower, that it may be intelligible; while it is certain that we shall never here perfectly understand the solution of these difficulties, is it not pardonable, among other mens conjectures, to say, That the noble faculty of Sense (because Brutes have it) is usually too basely described by Philosophers? And that Intellection and Volition in the rational Soul are a superior eminent sort of sensation transcending that of Brutes; and that Intelligere & Velle are eminenter sentire; and that the Intellect doth by understanding other things, eminently see or sense, and so understand that it understandeth: And ⟨p. 314⟩that the will doth by willing feel that it willeth: When I consult my Experience, I must either say thus, or else that Intellection and Volition so immediately ever move the Internal sense, that they are known by us only as acts compounded with that sense.