A27051:1053
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Ans. 1. It is one thing, what the judgment saith; and another thing, how it saith it. A speculative judgment may drowsily say, that God and Holiness are best▪ when yet it saith it but as a dreaming opinion, which prevaileth not with the will to choose them, having at the same time so strong an apprehension of the pleasures of sin as carrieth away the will and practice.
Ans. 1. It is one thing, what the judgment saith; and another thing, how it saith it. A speculative judgment may drowsily say, that God and Holiness are best▪ when yet it saith it but as a dreaming opinion, which prevaileth not with the will to choose them, having at the same time so strong an apprehension of the pleasures of sin as carryeth away the will and practice.
2. It is one thing therefore to love God under the notion ⟨p. 326⟩of being best, and another thing to love him best. For the will can cross such a notion of the understanding; at least by an omission, as appeareth by the sin of Adam, which began in the will (or else had been necessitated.) The same understanding which sluggishly saith, God or Holiness is better, yet may more clearly and vehemently say [Lust is pleasant, or Pleasure of the flesh is good] and being herein seconded with the strong apprehensions of sense and fantasy, the will may follow this simple judgment, and neglect the comparate.
2. It is one thing therefore to love God under the notion ⟨p. 326⟩of being best, and another thing to love him best. For the will can cross such a notion of the understanding; at least by an omission, as appeareth by the sin of Adam, which began in the will (or else had been necessitated.) The same understanding which sluggishly saith, God or Holiness is better, yet may more clearly and vehemently say [Lust is pleasant, or Pleasure of the flesh is good] and being herein seconded with the strong apprehensions of sense and fantasie, the will may follow this simple judgment, and neglect the comparate.