A27051:131
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
CERTAINTY being an ambiguous word, is either, I. Objective: which is, I. Of Being of the Thing; which is nothing but Physical Verity. II. Of Evidence; which makes things Perceptible; and it is Evidence, 1. Sensible; viz. 1. To the External Senses. 2. To the Internal Senses. 2. Intelligible, 1. Of the Being of Things, viz. 1. Quod sint, 2. Quid sint, 3. Qualia sint, 1. Things sensed and imagined; as colours, light, heat, &c. 2. The Acts of Intellection and Will. 2. Of Complex Verity, which is, 1. Of self-evident Principles. 2. Derivative Evidence of Conclusions. II. Subjective Certainty; by which I am certain of the Object; Considerable, I. In its Nature; viz. Certainty, 1. Of Sense, 1. Of the Outward Senses, when they are not deceived. 2. Of the Inward Sense and Imagination. 2. Of the Intellect; which is, 1. Of Beings, 1. Sensed and imagined, 2. Of the Acts of the Soul. 1. Quod sint. 2. Quid sint. 3. Qualia sint. 2. Of the Complex Verities, 1. Of self-evident Principles. 2. Of Conclusions. ⟨p. 31⟩(N. Qu. Whether there be not a third sort of Certainty both Objective and Subjective; viz. Goodness not-sensible, Certainly apprehended by the Intellectual Soul, not only sub ratione Veri, sed & Boni? and whether the Will by its Natural Gust have not a Complacential Perception of it as well as the Intellect? Vid. Pemble Vindic. Grot.) II. In the Degrees of Certainty; which are in the order following. 1. Sense perceiving the Object and it self, is the first perceiver; and hereof the surest. 2. Imagination receiving from Sense, hath more requisites to its Certainty. 3. Intellection about things sensible, hath yet more requisites to its Certainty; viz. 1. That the Object be true; 2. The Evidence sensible; 3. That the Sense be sound, and the Medium and other Conditions of Sense be just; 4. That the Imagination be not corrupt, 5. That the Intellect it self be sound. 4. But Intellection about It self and Volition hath the highest Certainty 5. We are surer of the Quod than the Quid and Quale; as that we Think, than What and How. 6. We are certainer of self-evident Principles than of the Consequences. 7. Consequences have various degrees of Evidence and Certainty.
A few Propositions may further help your understandings.