A27051:156
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But 1. It is false that sense perceiveth not substances: It is not only colour, quantity, figure, which I see, nor only roughness and smoothness which I feel, nor only sweetness which I taste; but it is a coloured, extended, figured substance which I see; a rough or smooth substance which I feel, and a sweet substance which I taste: And if the Accident were the only primary object, the Substance is the secondary and certain. Else no one ever saw a Man, a Tree, a Bird, a Plant, the Earth, a Book, or any substance; but only the colour, quantity or figure of them! no man ever felt or touched a Body, but only the Accidents of it.
2. And I pray you tell me how Substances come to the understanding if they were never in the sense: Prove a Substance without sensation as a medium if you can. Do you perceive any Substances Intellectually or not? If not, why pretend you that there are any? if yea, it must be either as Conclusions, or as Intellectual Principles, (which are both Logical complex Objects, and therefore not substances) or as the immediate immaterial objects of Intellection (which ⟨p. 37⟩is only the Souls own acts) or what is by Analogy gathered from them; or else the objects of sense it self. It can be none of the former; therefore it must be the latter: And how can the understanding find that in sense which was never there?
If it be said that it is there but by Accidents; I answer, 1. That is false, though said by many: I do as immediately touch substance as accidents, though not substance without the accidents. 2. Whether it be there by the mediation of the accidents, or immediately it self, we are sure that the understanding no otherwise receiveth it, than as the sense transmitteth it; we must know material substance as it is sensed, or not at all.