A27051:186
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
8. As therefore the degrees of doubting are variously overcome, so there must needs be various degrees of Certainty.
9. When doubting is so far overcome, as that the mind doth find rest and satisfaction in the Truth, it may be called Certainty. But when doubting is either prevalent, and so troublesome as to leave us wavering, it is not called Certainty.
10. It is not the forgetting or neglect of a difficulty or doubt, nor yet the wills rejecting it, which is properly called Certainty. ⟨p. 42⟩This quieteth the mind indeed, but not by the way of ascertaining Evidence. Therefore ignorant people that stumble upon a truth by chance with confidence, are not therefore Certain of it. And those that take it upon trust from a Priest or their Parents, or good peoples Opinion, are not therefore Certain of it. Nor they that say as some Papists, [Faith hath not evidence, but is a Voluntary reception of the Churches Testimony, and meritorious, because it hath not Evidence: Therefore though I see no cogent Evidence, I will believe, because it is my duty.] Whether this mans Faith may be saving or no, I will not now dispute; but certainly it is no Certainty of apprehension. He is not Certain of what he so believeth. This is but to cast away the doubt or difficulty, and not at all by Certainty to overcome it. 11. When a man hath attained a satisfying degree of perception, he is capable still of clearer perception. Even as when in the heating of water, after all the sensible cold is gone, the water may grow hotter and hotter still. So after all sensible doubting is gone, the perception may go clearer still. 12. But still the Objective Certainty is the same; that is, There is that Evidence in the object which is in suo genere sufficient to notify the thing to a prepared mind. 13. But this sufficiency is a respective proportion; and therefore, as it respecteth mans mind in common, it supposeth that by due means and helps, and industry, the mind may be brought certainly to discern this Evidence. But if you denominate the sufficiency of the Evidence, from its respect to the present disposition of mens minds, so it is almost as various as mens minds are. For recipitur ad modum recipientis; and that is a certifying sufficient Evidence of truth, to one man, which to a thousand others, is not so much as an Evidence of probability. Therefore mediate and immediate sufficiency and certainty of Evidence, must be distinguished.