A27051:203
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yet here no doubt, there are certainties, innumerable certainties, such as I have before described. We know something certainly of many things, even of all sensible objects. But we know nothing perfectly and comprehensively, not a worm, not a Leaf, not a Stone, or a Sand, not the Pen, Ink or Paper, which we write with; not the hand that writeth, nor the smallest particle of our bodies; not a hair or the least accident. In every thing nearest us, or in the world, the uncertainties and incognita are far more than that which we certainly know.
II. If I should enumerate to you the many uncertainties in our common Metaphysics, (yea about the Being of the Science) and our common Logic, &c. It would seem unsuitable to a Theological discourse. And yet it would not be unuseful, among such Theologues as the Schoolmen, who resolve more of their doubts by Aristotle than by the Holy Scriptures; doubtless, as Aristotle's Predicaments are not fitted to the kinds of beings, so many of his distributions and orders, yea and precepts are arbitrary. And as he left room and reason for the dissent of such as Taurellus, Carpenter, Jacchaeus, Gorlaeus, Ritschel, and abundance more, so have they also for mens dissent from them. Even Ramus hath more adversaries than followers. Gassendus goeth the right way, ⟨p. 48⟩by suiting verba rebus, if he had hit righter on the nature of things themselves. Most novel Philosophers are fain to make new Grammars and new Logics, for words and notions, to fit their new conceptions, as Campanella, and the Paracelsians, Helmontians, (and if you will name the Behmenists, Rosicrucians, Weigelians, &c.) Lullius thought he made the most accurate Art of notions; and he did indeed attempt to fit words to things: but he hath mist of a true accomplishment of his design, for want of a true method of Physics in his mind, to fit his words to. As Cornelius, Agrippa, 1who is one of his chief commentators, yet freely confesseth in his lib. de Vanitate Scientiarum, which now I think of; I will say no more of this, but desire the Reader to peruse that laudable book, and with it to read Sanchez his Nihil Scitur, to see uncertainty detected, so he will not be led by it too far into Scepticism. As also Mr. Glanviles Scepsis Scientifica.