A27051:566
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And to err, and know that a man erreth (at the same time, about the same thing) is a contradiction: For he that erreth judgeth a falsehood to be a truth: But to know that so to judge, is to err, is certainly not so to judge: For Intellectus vult verum, that is, Truth is the object which it is naturally inclined to. The same light which discovereth Error cureth it: And that light which discovereth the Thing it self, is it that must convince me that I before erred about it, by misapprehensions.
And to err, and know that a man erreth (at the same time, about the same thing) is a contradiction: For he that erreth judgeth a falshood to be a truth: But to know that so to judge, is to err, is certainly not so to judge: For Intellectus vult verum, that is, Truth is the object which it is naturally inclined to. The same light which discovereth Errour cureth it: And that light which discovereth the Thing it self, is it that must convince me that I before erred about it, by misapprehensions.
4. And an ignorant man doth not so much as know the difficulties of the case, and what may be said on the other side: What contrary Evidence convinceth others, or what weight there is in the objections, which are or may be brought against him. So that all men being naturally ignorant, and little being known for much that's unknown, ⟨p. 171⟩even to the wisest; alas, the temptation to Error and false Confidence is so strong, that few escape it.
4. And an ignorant man doth not so much as know the difficulties of the case, and what may be said on the other side: What contrary Evidence convinceth others, or what weight there is in the objections, which are or may be brought against him. So that all men being naturally ignorant, and little being known for much that's unknown, ⟨p. 171⟩even to the wisest; alas, the temptation to Errour and false Confidence is so strong, that few escape it.