A27051:586
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
X. Another frequent cause is, an appearance of something in the Truth, which frighteneth men from it; either for want of a clear, methodical, advantageous representation; or by some difficult objection; or some miscarriage in the utterance, carriage, or life of them that seem most zealous for it: such little things deceive dark man: And when he is turned from the Truth, he thinks that the contrary Error may be embraced without fear.
X. Another frequent cause is, an appearance of something in the Truth, which frighteneth men from it; either for want of a clear, methodical, advantageous representation; or by some difficult objection; or some miscarriage in the utterance, carriage, or life of them that seem most zealous for it: such little things deceive dark man: And when he is turned from the Truth, he thinks that the contrary Errour may be embraced without fear.
XI. Another great cause of Confidence in false Conceits, is the bias of some personal Interest prevailing with a corrupted Will, and the mixture of Sense and Passion in the Judgment. For, as interested men hardly believe what seemeth against them, and easily believe that which they would have to be true; so Sense and Passion (or Affections) usually so bear down Reason, that they think it their right to possess the Throne. Not but that Sense is the only discerner of its own sensible Object as such, (and Reason by Sense as it is intelligible:) But that's not the matter in hand. But the Sensualist forceth his Reason to call that Best for him, which his Sense is most delighted with, and that Worst which most offendeth Sense. The Drunkard will easily judge that his drinking is good for him, and the Glutton that his pleasant meats are lawful, and the Time-waster that his Plays are lawful, and the Fornicator, the wrathful revenger, &c. that their lusts and passions are lawful, because they think that they have Feeling on their side. It's hard to carry an upright Judgment against Sense and Passion.
XI. Another great cause of Confidence in false Conceits, is the byass of some personal Interest prevailing with a corrupted Will, and the mixture of Sense and Passion in the Judgment. For, as interested men hardly believe what seemeth against them, and easily believe that which they would have to be true; so Sense and Passion (or Affections) usually so bear down Reason, that they think it their right to possess the Throne. Not but that Sense is the only discerner of its own sensible Object as such, (and Reason by Sense as it is intelligible:) But that's not the matter in hand. But the Sensualist forceth his Reason to call that Best for him, which his Sense is most delighted with, and that Worst which most offendeth Sense. The Drunkard will easily judge that his drinking is good for him, and the Glutton that his pleasant meats are lawful, and the Time-waster that his Plays are lawful, and the Fornicator, the wrathful revenger, &c. that their lusts and passions are lawful, because they think that they have Feeling on their side. It's hard to carry an upright Judgment against Sense and Passion.