A27051:595
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I Easily foresee that besides the foresaid impediments, all these following Objections will hinder the Cure of false pretended knowledge and self-conceitedness, and false Belief, if they be not answered.
Obj. I. You move men to an Impossibility: To see without light; and for an erring man to believe that he erreth. He that hath not light to see the truth, hath not light to see his ignorance of it: This is no more than to persuade all men to be wise and not to err; which you may do long enough to little purpose.
Obj. I. You move men to an Impossibility: To see without light; and for an erring man to believe that he erreth. He that hath not light to see the truth, hath not light to see his ignorance of it: This is no more than to perswade all men to be wise and not to err; which you may do long enough to little purpose.
Ans. It is impossible indeed for an erring man, while such, to know that he erreth: but it is not impossible 1. For an ignorant man to know that he is ignorant, (nor for a man without light or sight to know that he seeth not; though he cannot see that he seeth not.) For though Nescience be Nothing; and Nothing is not properly and directly an Object of our Knowledge, no more than of our Sight: Yet as we see the limited quantity of substances, and so know little from big, by concluding that it hath no more quantity than we see; so we know our own knowledge, both as to Object and Act, and we know the degree of it, and to what it doth extend: And so can conclude, I know no more: And though Nescience be nothing, yet this Proposition, [I know no more] is not nothing. And so nothing is usually said to be known Reductively; but indeed it is not properly known at all; but this proposition de nihilo is known, which is something▪ (I will not here meddle with the question, whether God know non-entities.)