A27051:645
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Ans. 1. I say not that you are to conclude that certainly he lieth, and that it's false, but to suspend your belief, and to hope that it's false. 2. He that maketh himself the accuser of another man behind his Back, in a way of talk, doth expose himself to that disadvantage, and maketh it our duty to begin our charitable Opinion on the side of him that is accused, and rather to hope that he is innocent (caeteris paribus) than the accuser. For God forbiddeth backbiting and slandering, and biddeth us speak evil of no man. And he that in our hearing backbiteth and speaketh evil (how godly otherwise soever) without a clear necessary cause, doth forfeit our Charity and Belief, more than a man can do whom we do not see or hear. For if I was bound to judge him innocent before this backbiting, I am bound so to judge him still. Therefore I do but continue that good Opinion of my Neighbour which I was bound to: And that I must suspect the backbiter of a Lie, is the consequent of his own act, and long of himself. For I cannot believe contraries: And it is not his backbiting which will disoblige ⟨p. 195⟩me from my former duty, of judging the other innocent. So that it is the reporter that casteth away the reputation of his own veracity.
Obj. XIV. When you have written all this against pretended knowledge, who is more guilty than your self? Who so oppresseth his Reader with distinctions? Are all your large Writings evident certainties? Even those Controversies in which you have so many Adversaries?
Ans. I put in this objection, because I have a Book (called Methodus Theologiae) which I know will occasion such thoughts in many Readers. But 1. It is one thing to assert uncertainties; and another thing to anatomize, and distinctly, and methodically, explain a certain truth. In all my large writings, if you find that I call any thing certain which is uncertain, that is, which I give not ascertaining evidence of, acquaint me with the particulars, and I shall retract them.