A27051:703
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yea, 2. It is evident that the Soul is not Satisfied with bare knowing if no Delight or Complacency follow: For what is that which we call Satisfaction but the Complacency of the Will? Suppose a man to have no effect upon his Will, no Pleasure, no Contentation in his Knowledge, and what Felicity or Desirable Good to him, would there be, in all the Knowledge in the world? Yea when I name either [Good] or [Desirable] every one knoweth that I name an object of the Will. Therefore if you stop at bare Intellection, it is not to be called Good or Desirable as to the Intellect, these being not proper intellectual objects: Though remotely I confess they are; that is, that which is called Good, Amiable and Desirable primarily as the proper object of the Will, must be discerned to be such by the understanding: When yet the Formal notion of the Intellects object, is but quid Intelligibile, which materially is Ens, Unum, Verum, Bonum: But Goodness is the Formal notion of the object of the will, and not only the material.
Yea, 2. It is evident that the Soul is not Satisfied with bare knowing if no Delight or Complacency follow: For what is that which we call Satisfaction but the Complacency of the Will? Suppose a man to have no effect upon his Will, no Pleasure, no Contentation in his Knowledge, and what Felicity or Desireable Good to him, would there be, in all the Knowledge in the world? Yea when I name either [Good] or [Desirable] every one knoweth that I name an object of the Will. Therefore if you stop at bare Intellection, it is not to be called Good or Desireable as to the Intellect, these being not proper intellectual objects: Though remotely I confess they are; that is, that which is called Good, Amiable and Desireable primarily as the proper object of the Will, must be discerned to be such by the understanding: When yet the Formal notion of the Intellects object, is but quid Intelligibile, which materially is Ens, Unum, Verum, Bonum: But Goodness is the Formal notion of the object of the will, and not only the material.
1If any say that I seem here to take part with Epicurus, (and Cicero's Torquatus) who erred by placing the chief excellency of Virtue in the Pleasure of it; and consequently making any thing more Excellent which is more Pleasant, though it be sin itself; I answer, he that will decide that great controversy, must distinguish, 1. Between Sensitive Pleasure, and the Complacency of the Will. 2. Between that which is Good only to me, and that which is Good to others, and that which is Good in relation to the Supreme and Final Will of God. 3. Between the Exterior and the Interior acts of Virtue. And then you shall