A27051:711
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
7. And to end all this Controversy between us and Epicurus, it is notorious, that the Internal Vital Acts of true Virtue, are nothing else radically but Pleasure it self: For it is radically and summarily nothing but the Love of God and ⟨p. 214⟩Goodness: And Love in its properest notion is nothing but the Complacency of the Will. To say, I love it, is but to say, It pleaseth me; unless when you speak of either sensual appetite and delight, or Love as conjunct with some other act or passion. And (though Occam here stretch it a little too far) it is certain that the external act of man hath no Virtue in it that is Moral, but secondary and derived from the Will, even as far as it is Voluntary: So that the informing root of all Virtue is Will, Love, or Complacency; which Austin useth to call Delectation, asserting what I now assert. So that the Question now is, Whether Virtue, which is nothing but Complacency in Good, be better as Complacency or as Virtue, that is, under one Name or another? or whether it be better as Virtue, or as Virtue? as Complacency, or as Complacency?
7. And to end all this Controversie between us and Epicurus, it is notorious, that the Internal Vital Acts of true Virtue, are nothing else radically but Pleasure it self: For it is radically and summarily nothing but the Love of God and ⟨p. 214⟩Goodness: And Love in its properest notion is nothing but the Complacency of the Will. To say, I love it, is but to say, It pleaseth me; unless when you speak of either sensual appetite and delight, or Love as conjunct with some other act or passion. And (though Occam here stretch it a little too far) it is certain that the external act of man hath no Virtue in it that is Moral, but secondary and derived from the Will, even as far as it is Voluntary: So that the informing root of all Virtue is Will, Love, or Complacency; which Austin useth to call Delectation, asserting what I now assert. So that the Question now is, Whether Virtue, which is nothing but Complacency in Good, be better as Complacency or as Virtue, that is, under one Name or another? or whether it be better as Virtue, or as Virtue? as Complacency, or as Complacency?