A27051:717
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
II. The second proof is fetched from the Objects: It is not mere Intelligibility that blesseth a man, but Goodness, which as such is the formal Object of the Will, though the material Object of the Understanding. It is a pleasant thing for the Eyes to behold the Sun: And as pleasant, it is good; and also as useful to further pleasure of our selves or others. Nothing maketh a man Good or Happy but as it is Good. Therefore the Goodness of God, (his transcendent perfection by which he is first Essentially Good in himself, and amiable to himself, and then Good and Amiable to us all) is the ultimately ultimate object of mans Soul, to which his Intelligibility is supposed.
II. The second proof is fetcht from the Objects: It is not meer Intelligibility that blesseth a man, but Goodness, which as such is the formal Object of the Will, though the material Object of the Understanding. It is a pleasant thing for the Eyes to behold the Sun: And as pleasant, it is good; and also as useful to further pleasure of our selves or others. Nothing maketh a man Good or Happy but as it is Good. Therefore the Goodness of God, (his transcendent perfection by which he is first Essentially Good in himself, and amiable to himself, and then Good and Amiable to us all) is the ultimately ultimate object of mans Soul, to which his Intelligibility is supposed.
III. The third proof is from the Constitution of these several […] a Knowledge being but an introductive act, supposeth not Love, as to its Essence (though it produce it as an Effect:) But Love included knowledge in it; as the number of two includeth one, when one doth not include two. Therefore […] together must needs be perfecter than one alone.
III. The third proof is from the Constitution of these several 〈…〉 a Knowledge being but an introductive act, supposeth not Love, as to its Essence (though it produce it as an Effect:) But Love included knowledge in it; as the number of two includeth one, when one doth not include two. Therefore 〈…〉 ogether must needs be perfecter than one alone.