A27051:784
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Or if any may be said to have a Speculative knowledge of all this in the Creature (the Nature, Order, and Use,) yet he is without the true Practical Knowledge, which is it that only is Knowledge indeed, and of use and benefit to man. For to be able to speak or write a true Proposition about God or the Creature, is not properly to know God or the Creature, but to know names and words concerning them: It is but a Logical Knowledge of Notions, and not the knowledge of the Thing it self, to be able to say and know that this or that concerning it, is true or false. Nothing more deceiveth mankind, both in point of Learning and of Religion, and Salvation, than mistaking the Organical or Logical Knowledge of second Notions, Words, Propositions, Inferences and Methods, for the Real Knowledge of the Things themselves; And thinking that they know a thing, because they know what to say of it.
He knoweth not a Country, who is only able by the Map or hear-say to describe it. He knoweth not Motion, Light, Heat, Cold, Sweet, Bitter, that knoweth no more than to give a true definition of it. And as this is true of things sensible, which must themselves be perceived first by sense, so is it of things spiritual, which must themselves be perceived first by Intellection, and not only the notions and definitions of them. He that doth not intuitively or by internal ⟨p. 229⟩immediate perception, know what it is to Understand, to Remember, to Will and Nill, to Love and Hate, and consequently to be able to do these acts, doth not know what a man is, or what a Reasonable Soul is, and what an Intellectual Spirit is, though he could (were it possible) without these, learn the Definition of a Man, a Soul, a Spirit. A definition or word of art spoken by a Parrot, or a madman proveth not that he knoweth the thing.
He knoweth not a Countrey, who is only able by the Map or hear-say to describe it. He knoweth not Motion, Light, Heat, Cold, Sweet, Bitter, that knoweth no more than to give a true definition of it. And as this is true of things sensible, which must themselves be perceived first by sense, so is it of things spiritual, which must themselves be perceived first by Intellection, and not only the notions and definitions of them. He that doth not intuitively or by internal