A27051:84
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
IX. And the narrowness of mans mind and thoughts is such, that usually there must go many partial conceptions, to one thing or Object really indivisible: So that few things, or nothing rather in the world, is known by us with one conception, nor with a simplicity of apprehensions answerable to the simplicity of the things: And hereby it cometh to pass that Inadequate conceptions make up a great part of our Learning and knowledge. And (yet worse) our words being narrower than our Thoughts, we are fain to multiply words more than conceptions, so that we must have ten conceptions perhaps of one thing, and twenty words perhaps for those ten conceptions. And then we grow to imagine the things to be as various as our conceptions, yea and our words: And so Learning is become confused error, and the great and noble Actions of the Fantastical world, are a pitiful confused agitation of Phantasms, and (whether fortuitous or artificial) a congress of Atoms, sometimes digladiating, and sometimes seeming by amicable embraces to compose some excellent piece of Art. And things seem to us to be multiplied and ordered as our conceptions of them are. And the Scotists may yet write as many more Treatises de formalitatibus, before men will understand indeed what a conceptus formalis with them is, and whether diverse formalities be diverse realities, or only ejusdem conceptus inadequati. But thus Learning is become like a puppet play, or the raising of the dust.
IX. And the narrowness of mans mind and thoughts is such, that usually there must go many partial conceptions, to one thing or Object really indivisible: So that few things, or nothing rather in the world, is known by us with one conception, nor with a simplicity of apprehensions answerable to the simplicity of the things: And hereby it cometh to pass that Inadequate conceptions make up a great part of our Learning and knowledge. And (yet worse) our words being narrower than our Thoughts, we are fain to multiply words more than conceptions, so that we must have ten conceptions perhaps of one thing, and twenty words perhaps for those ten conceptions. And then we grow to imagine the things to be as various as our conceptions, yea and our words: And so Learning is become confused error, and the great and noble Actions of the Phantastical world, are a pitiful confused agitation of Phantasms, and (whether fortuitous or artificial) a congress of Atoms, sometimes digladiating, and sometimes seeming by amicable embraces to compose some excellent piece of Art. And things seem to us to be multiplyed and ordered as our conceptions of them are. And the Scotists may yet write as many more Treatises de formalitatibus, before men will understand indeed what a conceptus formalis with them is, and whether diverse formalities be diverse realities, or only ejusdem conceptus inadequati. But thus Learning is become like a poppet play, or the raising of the dust.