A27051:88
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts
A treatise of knowledge and love compared in two parts: I. of falsely pretended knowledge, II. of true saving knowledge and love ... / by Richard Baxter ...
London: printed for Tho. Parkhurst, 1689
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
XIII. 1. The substance of Spirits is so little known, as tempteth Sadducees to dream that there are none. The notion of a Spirit to some (through ignorance) is taken to be merely negative, as if it signified no more, but [not corporeal.] The notion of Immateriality is lubricous, and he that knoweth not the true bounds of the signification of Materia, knoweth not what it is to be Immaterial. The purest Spirit is known only by many inadequate conceptions: One must answer the similitude of Matter, in fundamental substantiality: Another must be answerable to that of Forms of simple Elements; and another answerable to Accidents. ⟨p. 20⟩And though nothing be so notorious of Spirits as their Operations, and from the Acts we know the Virtues or Powers, yet that these Virtues are not Accidents, but the very Essential Form, and that they are (in all Spirits) One in Three, and many other things concerning their Essentiality, are quite overlooked by the greater part of Philosophers; and those few that open it, do either with Campanella, lose it again in a wood of mistaken ill gathered consequences; or with Lullius, drown it in a multitude of irregular arbitrary notions; or with Commenius, give us a little undigested, with the mixture of crudities and mistakes; or with our Learned Dr. Glisson de vitâ Naturae, confound Spirits and Bodies, and make those Spirits which are the Vital constitutive principle of Compounds, to be but the inadequate conception of Bodies, as if they were all simply and formally Vital of themselves, and for a Body to be inanimate were a contradiction, or impossible. And they that treat more nobly of Spirits (as Mr. Got and many Platonists) do it so immethodically and confusedly, as greatly disadvantageth the Learner.
XIII. 1. The substance of Spirits is so little known, as tempteth Sadduces to dream that there are none. The notion of a Spirit to some (through ignorance) is taken to be meerly negative, as if it signified no more, but [not corporeal.] The notion of Immateriality is lubricous, and he that knoweth not the true bounds of the signification of Materia, knoweth not what it is to be Immaterial. The purest Spirit is known only by many inadequate conceptions: One must answer the similitude of Matter, in fundamental substantiality: Another must be answerable to that of Forms of simple Elements; and another answerable to Accidents. ⟨p. 20⟩