A27059:185
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Answ. If by materia, be meant substantia, quae potentia corpus est, or substantia incompleta in potentia ad omnes formas, which is Aristotle's materia prima; or if any element, or any body be hereby meant, so we deny that the soul is material, or that it is hence inferred to be such. But if material be extended as far as substantial, or so far as to comprehend spirits (improperly), then it is granted on both sides, that the soul is material. But supposing it taken in the usual sense, I answer, that God can cause spiritual substances to propagate their kind: and go. such propagation proveth neither their materiality or mortality; no more than the creation of the first animals proved their immortality: nor is it any inconvenience to grant, that two souls do join in the communicative generation of a third, as long as it is not by partition, or deperdition of any of their substance; no more than that two candles conjoined should light a third. But the large handling of this would require more time and words than we shall now ⟨p. 106⟩spare. I refer the Reader therefore to those that have handled this subject on purpose; and particularly to Micraelius in his Ethnophronius. It is not a Traduction e potentia materiae that we maintain. The materiale seminis is but as the oil to the flame, to which the soul is conjunct. The semen containeth quid immateriale; the soul is in it, not only in potentia, but in actu, as it is in the leg or arm of a man. If you object that then the soul is divided, and part of it dieth quum semen ejicitur & moritur: I answer; Not so; no more than it is divided when a man is beheaded, or dieth when a leg or arm dieth that is cut off.
Answ. If by materia, be meant substantia, quae potentia corpus est, or substantia incompleta in potentia ad omnes formas, which is Aristotle's materia prima; or if any element, or any body be hereby meant, so we deny that the soul is material, or that it is hence inferred to be such. But if material be extended as far as substantial, or so far as to comprehend spirits (improperly), then it is granted on both sides, that the soul is material. But supposing it taken in the usual sense, I answer, that God can cause spiritual substances to propagate their kind: and go. such propagation proveth neither their materiality or mortality; no more than the creation of the first animals proved their immortality: nor is it any inconvenience to grant, that two souls do joyn in the communicative generation of a third, as long as it is not by partition, or deperdition of any of their substance; no more than that two candles conjoyned should light a third. But the large handling of this would require more time and words than we shall now