A27059:254
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. And then for the cause of it, there's the difference. We say that God inflicteth not all this but for their own desert by original sin: And our Adversaries say, that he doth it without the least fault or desert of theirs. And then I would know whether there be any reason why God doth all this against infants, but because he will do it? If man had never sinned, he might have done it according to them. If it be said, that he punisheth the Parents in the children: I answer, 1. What punishment to Parents is the everlasting loss or suffering of the children? 2. Or what punishment is the present death of children, to harlots and unnatural persons, that desire to be rid of them? 3. And how can he cause the subjects of his Kingdom to suffer so much without their own desert? 4. And if their natural interest make them not in some measure partakers of their Parents sin, what reason, why they any more than other creatures, should be chosen to the suffering?
And here I would propound this question: What if God had left it in the beginning to Adam's free will, whether he would beget a man, or a toad, or a serpent? Would you have thought this a cruelty, or injustice? Why might not God leave such a thing to his free will, as well as his own ⟨p. 140⟩salvation or damnation? And if he might leave it to a serpent necessarily to beget a serpent, why might he not leave it to the will of man to do it freely? And if man had chosen such a generation, could his offspring (if capable) have charged God with cruelty? And if not, (as nothing surer) why might not God leave it to the will of man to remain righteous, and beget a righteous seed; or to fall, and beget such as himself?
Obj. 7. But the pains of hell consist in the torments of conscience: and the conscience of an infant will not torment him for that which he could not help.