A27059:283
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Prop. 8. When the sufferings of a child are but the mere consequents of the Parents sin or punishment, then are they no punishment themselves, unless equivocally so called: but when they are intended by the Rector for the demonstration of justice for the Parents fault, then it hath the nature of punishment, though the child were imagined innocent. For example; If a Traitor be sentenced to death, and his estate forfeited to the Prince, his Heirs will be deprived of all their hopes, though the Judge never thought of them in his sentence, because the Parent cannot convey to his posterity what he hath lost himself. And here the suffering of the Heirs is not formally a punishment, ⟨p. 151⟩but the mere consequent of a punishment. But if the Rector do ordain that the Heirs of a Traitor shall be disinherited, and intend this as part of the penalty, to deter others from Treason, then it is not a mere consequent, but a real punishment, though the Heir be personally innocent.
Prop. 8. When the sufferings of a child are but the meer consequents of the Parents sin or punishment, then are they no punishment themselves, unless equivocally so called: but when they are intended by the Rector for the demonstration of justice for the Parents fault, then it hath the nature of punishment, though the child were imagined innocent. For example; If a Traytor be sentenced to death, and his estate forfeited to the Prince, his Heirs will be deprived of all their hopes, though the Judge never thought of them in his sentence, because the Parent cannot convey to his posterity what he hath lost himself. And here the suffering of the Heirs is not formally a punishment, ⟨p. 151⟩but the meer consequent of a punishment. But if the Rector do ordain that the Heirs of a Traytor shall be desinherited, and intend this as part of the penalty, to deter others from Treason, then it is not a meer consequent, but a real punishment, though the Heir be personally innocent.
Prop. 9. It seems to me that we are so far guilty both of Adam's sin, and of our nearer Parents, committed whilst we were seminally in them, as that God may, not only without injustice, but also in positive execution of vindictive justice, punish us with temporal death for such guilt, though it be but a more imperfect kind of guilt and punishment.