A27059:290
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Prop. 15. Yet as God is Rector of each particular person as well as of societies, so he dealeth justly with every person, and therefore in punishing societies, he still observeth his established Laws concerning individuals: and therefore he punisheth no person beyond his due: For, 1. it is supposed that a man who by consent is a member of any Society, doth consent to bear or venture on the common inconveniences and infelicity ⟨p. 152⟩[…] ⟨p. 153⟩[…] ⟨p. 154⟩of that Society, so that he may be partaker of the felicity and benefits of it: and where nature makes a man a member of a society, it supplies the place of our personal consent. For in it self it is a necessary good to us to be in society with others, seeing no man can live happily by himself; and it is supposed in nature, that no man will dissent from his own necessary good. It is therefore by their own consent fundamentally, that such persons, though innocent in themselves, are made liable to punishment; and therefore in all wars, when the innocent do suffer with the guilty, in the besieging of a City, the punishing of a Country, it is no injustice.
Prop. 15. Yet as God is Rector of each particular person as well as of societies, so he dealeth justly with every person, and therefore in punishing societies, he still observeth his established Laws concerning individuals: and therefore he punisheth no person beyond his due: For, 1. it is supposed that a man who by consent is a member of any Society, doth consent to bear or venture on the common inconveniencies and infelicity ⟨p. 152⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 153⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 154⟩of that Society, so that he may be partaker of the felicity and benefits of it: and where nature makes a man a member of a society, it supplies the place of our personal consent. For in it self it is a necessary good to us to be in society with others, seeing no man can live happily by himself; and it is supposed in nature, that no man will dissent from his own necessary good. It is therefore by their own consent fundamentally, that such persons, though innocent in themselves, are made liable to punishment; and therefore in all wars, when the innocent do suffer with the guilty, in the besieging of a City, the punishing of a Country, it is no injustice.