A27059:302
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Prop. 21. A further difference may yet appear between the guilt of Adam's first sin, and our guilt of his following sins, or the sins of our nearer Parents; if we distinguish between the Fundamentum and the Terminus of guilt, and then observe, that the Terminus is but one and the same, but the Foundation is divers. The punishment which we are guilty of, or liable to, by Adam's sin, is the privation of our whole felicity. The new guilt of our nearer Parents sin, or Adam's further sins, yea, or our own actual sin, can bring no new punishment on us according to the covenant of Works, (though according to the covenant of Grace, which giveth new mercies, whose privation we are capable of, we may have new punishments, which the first sin did not bring us under). As to the pain of loss it is clear; because when we have forfeited all, we can forfeit no more: but by the first sin we forfeited all. But this is not because the sin in its own nature hath not the same demerit as the first: but because man is capable of no greater privation than he hath incurred already; nor of any greater torment, if the first sin deserved as much torment, as mans nature was capable of. So that terminative here is no new super-added punishment, according to the first Law. ⟨p. 163⟩But yet none may hence conclude that here is no new guilt; because it is another fundamentaliter & formaliter. For divers relations may have the same Terminus. We do by following sins incur a new and further obligation to the same penalty; which would be to a greater penalty, were we capable of it naturally. When a Felon is guilty of death on one crime, yet twenty bills may be brought in against him, which may charge him with a manifold guilt, though but of one death. As a man may have a manifold right to one good thing which he possesseth, and a right super-added to his first right, (as God hath the right of Redemption to us, super-added to the right of Creation); so may a sinner have super-added, and manifold obligations to the same punishment. Yet here we see some difference between our first guilt of Adam's sin, and all super-added guilt; that the first having deprived us of all our felicity, none that follows can deprive us of any more, (except of the mercies new given us by the Gospel, which the mere sins of Parents shall deprive no man of, that disowneth them).
Prop. 21. A further difference may yet appear between the guilt of Adam's first sin, and our guilt of his following sins, or the sins of our neerer Parents; if we distinguish between the Fundamentum and the Terminus of guilt, and then observe, that the Terminus is but one and the same, but the Foundation is divers. The punishment which we are guilty of, or liable to, by Adam's sin, is the privation of our whole felicity. The new guilt of our neerer Parents sin, or Adam's further sins, yea, or our own actual sin, can bring no new punishment on us according to the covenant of Works, (though according to the covenant of Grace, which giveth new mercies, whose privation we are capable of, we may have new punishments, which the first sin did not bring us under). As to the pain of loss it is clear; because when we have forfeited all, we can forfeit no more: but by the first sin we forfeited all. But this is not because the sin in its own nature hath not the same demerit as the first: but because man is capable of no greater privation than he hath incurred already; nor of any greater torment, if the first sin deserved as much torment, as mans nature was capable of. So that terminative here is no new super-added punishment, according to the first Law.