A27059:306
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Some Divines say that God took away his image from Adam: some that he took away his spirit, and so the loss of his image followed: some that Adam's sin did it self destroy, or blot out that image. As to the first; I say, 1. It is not sound; because it makes God the most proper immediate, (if not the only true) efficient cause of sin, and of the sinning sin, which is the worst of sins: Also, because there is no word of God that saith any such thing. 2. If it were true, the sin of Cain deserved the same, as well as the sin of Adam.
As to the second opinion, I say, 1. It is yet undetermined (de nomine) among Divines, whether it be not the Redeemer only that giveth the spirit, and whether it can properly be said that God gave his spirit to Adam in innocency? though I am for the affirmative. 2. But suppose that there be some conserving aid which God did withdraw, by what name soever it be called: yet that withdrawing was in order of nature consequential to mans sinning, and not before it: and that sin it self did deprave the soul. 3. The sin of Cain deserveth the like desertion as well as the sin of Adam: but man's nature is not now capable of it in the same sort as then it was, because then we were innocent, and had the perfect image of ⟨p. 166⟩God upon us, and were capable of losing it: but now we have lost it already, our Parents sins can but remove us further from God, and hinder our recovery.
As to the second opinion, I say, 1. It is yet undetermined (de nomine) among Divines, whether it be not the Redeemer only that giveth the spirit, and whether it can properly be said that God gave his spirit to Adam in innocency? though I am for the affirmative. 2. But suppose that there be some conserving aid which God did withdraw, by what name soever it be called: yet thaat withdrawing was in order of nature consequential to mans sinning, and not before it: and that sin it self did deprave the soul. 3. The sin of Cain deserveth the like desertion as well as the sin of Adam: but man's nature is not now capable of it in the same sort as then it was, because then we were innocent, and had the perfect image of ⟨p. 166⟩God upon us, and were capable of losing it: but now we have lost it already, our Parents sins can but remove us further from God, and hinder our recovery.
The third opinion seemeth most warrantable, that Adam put away, or blotted out God's image, and so depraved his own soul: (for which see Capel of Tempt, and Thes. Salmuriens. Vol. 1. disp. de statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam; sect. 19, 20, 21.) But there is the same reason why Cain's sin should deprive his posterity of God's image, save only that they had not the same to lose: for the destructive nature of the sin is the same, and so is the merit. And though they have not that perfect image of God now to lose, yet they have some remnants of moral virtue, assisted by the light and law of nature; and the nature of man is capable of being made worse than yet it is: And there is the same reason why Cain's sin may make it worse, as there is why Adam's may make it bad.
Man's fall was a change of his end: He first took God for his ultimate end, and chief good: He was seduced to take him for one that envied his felicity, and for a liar, and to seek his felicity in the creature, against the command of God. The ultimate end of man's actions being thus changed, all moral ⟨p. 167⟩good is so far perverted; for all means and subordinate ends depend on it. And so the stream of mans actions are turned into a wrong channel; the sensitive appetite is hereupon become the master-principle in the soul, as ruling the rest. For, as Placaeus saith, ubi sup. Cujus facultatis finis proximus est hominis ultimus, ea caeteris omnibus facultatibus, tanquam architectonica, imperat: that faculty whose nearest end is mans ultimate end, doth rule all the other faculties, as the master of the work. And thus man being turned finally to sensibles from God, his nature is depraved, and God's image defaced. Yet is not the soul removed to the utmost distance from God; for then he should be as bad as the Devils, and all men should be equally evil; and the sensitive appetite would so uncontrolledly reign, that man would be worse than brutified, his reason serving only to purvey for the flesh, so that the light and law of nature would not restrain him, nor any thoughts of a God, and a life everlasting, once stop him in his sin. Now it is apparent that there is the same natural (and meritorious) force in Cain's sin to turn his nature further from God, as was in Adam's to turn it so far away: Or if man were at the worst, yet his following sins have the same power to fix him in that misery, as ⟨p. 168⟩his first had to bring him into it. For they also are a wilful turning from God to the creature, as well as the first.
Man's fall was a change of his end: He first took God for his ultimate end, and chief good: He was seduced to take him for one that envied his felicity, and for a liar, and to seek his felicity in the creature, against the command of God. The ultimate end of man's actions being thus changed, all moral ⟨p. 167⟩good is so far perverted; for all means and subordinate ends depend on it. And so the stream of mans actions are turned into a wrong channel; the sensitive appetite is hereupon become the master-principle in the soul, as ruling the rest. For, as Placaeus saith, ubi sup. Cujus facultatis finis proximus est hominis ultimus, ea caeteris omnibus facultatibus, tanquam architectonica, imperat: that faculty whose neerest end is mans ultimate end, doth rule all the other faculties, as the master of the work. And thus man being turned finally to sensibles from God, his nature is depraved, and God's image defaced. Yet is not the soul removed to the utmost distance from God; for then he should be as bad as the Devils, and all men should be equally evil; and the sensitive appetite would so uncontrouledly reign, that man would be worse than bruitified, his reason serving only to purvey for the flesh, so that the light and law of nature would not restrain him, nor any thoughts of a God, and a life everlasting, once stop him in his sin. Now it is apparent that there is the same natural (and meritorious) force in Cain's sin to turn his nature further from God, as was in Adam's to turn it so far away: Or if man were at the worst, yet his following sins have the same power to fix him in that misery, as ⟨p. 168⟩his first had to bring him into it. For they also are a wilful turning from God to the creature, as well as the first.
Arg. 2. It is past all doubt that the sinners own personal nature is made worse by his own actual sin: experience proves it too fully: Scripture saith, that they that have been accustomed to do evil, can no more learn to do well, than a Blackmoor can change his skin, or a Leopard his spots. And there is no reason that I know of that can be given, why a more corrupt Parent should not beget a child more corrupt, and deliver him the sinful improvement of his pravity, as well as that all sinful depraved Parents should beget depraved children: And though this controversy be mixed with the great difficulties about the propagation of the soul, and the matter of its corruption, yet which way soever those be determined, it makes not against the thing that I assert. If the soul be ex traduce, and so corrupted, then the case is most easy. If man beget the sensitive soul corrupted, and God do then promove that to the excellency of being a rational soul, (as some think the material species of the fantasy is raised by the active intellect to be the intelligible immaterial species); still there is the same reason why the more corrupt Parent should propagate a soul more corrupt, as that all ⟨p. 169⟩should propagate a corrupt one. If the soul be depraved either by a taint from the body, or by a willing accommodation of it self to the body, through the force of the natural desire of union, (de quo vide Placaeum ubi supra,) as water to the shape of the vessel that it is put into: still the reason holds the same for the degree of corruption, as for the thing it self. That God by way of penalty should create the soul sinful immediately, seems plainly to make him the Author of sin: But if it were so, yet there is the same reason of demerit, to provoke him to create the soul of Cain's son yet more sinful, as there is in Adam's to provoke him to create it sinful at all.
Arg. 2. It is past all doubt that the sinners own personal nature is made worse by his own actual sin: experience proves it too fully: Scripture saith, that they that have been accustomed to do evil, can no more learn to do well, than a Blackmoor can change his skin, or a Leopard his spots. And there is no reason that I know of that can be given, why a more corrupt Parent should not beget a child more corrupt, and deliver him the sinful improvement of his pravity, as well as that all sinful depraved Parents should beget depraved children: And though this controversy be mixed with the great difficulties about the propagation of the soul, and the matter of its corruption, yet which way soever those be determined, it makes not against the thing that I assert. If the soul be ex traduce, and so corrupted, then the case is most easy. If man beget the sensitive soul corrupted, and God do then promove that to the excellency of being a rational soul, (as some think the material species of the phantasy is raised by the active intellect to be the intelligible immaterial species); still there is the same reason why the more corrupt Parent should propagate a soul more corrupt, as that all ⟨p. 169⟩should propagate a corrupt one. If the soul be depraved either by a taint from the body, or by a willing accommodation of it self to the body, through the force of the natural desire of union, (de quo vide Placaeum ubi supra,) as water to the shape of the vessel that it is put into: still the reason holds the same for the degree of corruption, as for the thing it self. That God by way of penalty should create the soul sinful immediately, seems plainly to make him the Author of sin: But if it were so, yet there is the same reason of demerit, to provoke him to create the soul of Cain's son yet more sinful, as there is in Adam's to provoke him to create it sinful at all.
Arg. 3. Besides, experience assureth us, that all children bring not an equal degree of pravity into the World, if we may judge by their first exercise of reason, or use of passions. But if there were no difference made since, it should seem that all should be corrupted alike, (further than God cureth any, and so maketh a difference.) We see also that many of the children of the most vicious people are more vicious than the ordinary sort of men are. We see also that some mens bodies being distempered by their vices, they propagate those bodily distempers to their posterity; which we evidently perceive ⟨p. 170⟩do make a great alteration on the soul: from whence we see some persons very sottish and silly, yea some idiots, and some extreme talkative, some extreme passionate, some lustful, some malicious, some gluttonous, some drunkards, and this above the corrupt inclination which appeareth in the ordinary sort of men; and plainly sed by the temper of the body.
Arg. 3. Besides, experience assureth us, that all children bring not an equal degree of pravity into the World, if we may judge by their first exercise of reason, or use of passions. But if there were no difference made since, it should seem that all should be corrupted alike, (further than God cureth any, and so maketh a difference.) We see also that many of the children of the most vicious people are more vicious than the ordinary sort of men are. We see also that some mens bodies being distempered by their vices, they propagate those bodily distempers to their posterity; which we evidently perceive ⟨p. 170⟩do make a great alteration on the soul: from whence we see some persons very sottish and silly, yea some ideots, and some extreme talkative, some extreme passionate, some lustful, some malicious, some gluttonous, some drunkards, and this above the corrupt inclination which appeareth in the ordinary sort of men; and plainly sed by the temper of the body.
Obj. 1. If our corruption were increased by the sins of immediate Parents, then the World would grow worse and worse, and we should have been Devils long before this age.
Answ. 1. Most Divines say that the first sin would have done all this, if God in mercy had not prevented or remedied it. 2. God still resolveth to keep the World in order under his Government; and therefore restraineth corruption, and will not suffer it to grow, as according to its nature it would. 3. This is one of the common benefits that the World receiveth by the grace of the Redeemer, that they grow not as bad as else they would. 4. For the sake of the Church God will restrain them.
Obj. 2. We see many of the worst men have good children.
Answ. No mans corruptions do put his children into a remediless condition: and therefore God may sanctify whom and ⟨p. 171⟩when he pleaseth. So may he do also by the Parents themselves, for all their sins; and yet those sins do make them worse.
Answ. No mans corruptions do put his children into a remediless condition: and therefore God may sanctifie whom and ⟨p. 171⟩when he pleaseth. So may he do also by the Parents themselves, for all their sins; and yet those sins do make them worse.
Obj. 3. Then you may say that Grace is propagated by generation from our immediate Parents, as well as sin: and yet experience telleth us the contrary.
Answ. 1. This makes as much against the propagation of original corruption from Adam, as from our nearer Parents. If it were of any force, it would be against both. 2. There is so great a difference between grace and sin, that quite alters the case. For, 1. Grace is something extrinsically adventitious, and now (as to the cause of it, and manner of working it) supernatural: but so is not sin. 2. Grace is an adventitious perfecting quality: Sin is a defect, (as it is in the rational faculties). But defects are more easily propagated, than adventitious qualities: for one requireth nothing thereto but a defective nature; (for nothing can convey to another that which it hath not it self:) but the other requireth more than nature to its propagation. No acquired knowledge or skill in Languages, Sciences, Arts, or Manufactures, are propagated to posterity by nature: but the ignorance of these is natural. 3. But above all, it's considerable that original sin, so far as it ⟨p. 172⟩containeth a positive inclination, seems to be radically in the inordination of the sensitive appetite, raging against the rule of reason, (though the rational faculty be corrupted too, and gives up it self to the slavery of the sensitive; yet the sensitive seems to be the root.) Now it is evident that nature doth much in propagation of the sensitive, (or else man should do less in generation than a beast). But Grace is radically subjected in the rational faculties, (though by participation also it reach the sensitive:) and here nature doth less in propagation. We see by experience that a natural gentleness and calmness of the passions, and such other lower common virtues as are subjected in the sensitive part, are born with some men; and from the temperament of the body, one man is more mild, patient, temperate than another: but it is not so with the intellectual Perfections, nor Christian Graces, Faith, Hope, or Charity.
Answ. 1. This makes as much against the propagation of original corruption from Adam, as from our neerer Parents. If it were of any force, it would be against both. 2. There is so great a difference between grace and sin, that quite alters the case. For, 1. Grace is something extrinsecally adventitious, and now (as to the cause of it, and manner of working it) supernatural: but so is not sin. 2. Grace is an adventitious perfecting quality: Sin is a defect, (as it is in the rational faculties). But defects are more easily propagated, than adventitious qualities: for one requireth nothing thereto but a defective nature; (for nothing can convey to another that which it hath not it self:) but the other requireth more than nature to its propagation. No acquired knowledge or skill in Languages, Sciences, Arts, or Manufactures, are propagated to posterity by nature: but the ignorance of these is natural. 3. But above all, it's considerable that original sin, so far as it ⟨p. 172⟩containeth a positive inclination, seems to be radically in the inordination of the sensitive appetite, raging against the rule of reason, (though the rational faculty be corrupted too, and gives up it self to the slavery of the sensitive; yet the sensitive seems to be the root.) Now it is evident that nature doth much in propagation of the sensitive, (or else man should do less in generation than a beast). But Grace is radically subjected in the rational faculties, (though by participation also it reach the sensitive:) and here nature doth less in propagation. We see by experience that a natural gentleness and calmness of the passions, and such other lower common virtues as are subjected in the sensitive part, are born with some men; and from the temperament of the body, one man is more mild, patient, temperate than another: but it is not so with the intellectual Perfections, nor Christian Graces, Faith, Hope, or Charity.
I shall now proceed to prove so much of the affirmative, as I have here owned more than is now held, viz. That there ariseth to children from the sins of their nearest Parents, such an imperfect guilt, so called by analogy of attribution, as that God may in vindictive justice inflict on them for the same, the penalty (so called by the same analogy) both of temporal ⟨p. 173⟩death, and of eternal, at least as to the penalty of loss; supposing that it be not pardoned through Christ.
I shall now proceed to prove so much of the affirmative, as I have here owned more than is now held, viz. That there ariseth to children from the sins of their neerest Parents, such an imperfect guilt, so called by analogie of attribution, as that God may in vindictive justice inflict on them for the same, the penalty (so called by the same analogy) both of temporal ⟨p. 173⟩death, and of eternal, at least as to the penalty of loss; supposing that it be not pardoned through Christ.
And this I prove by these following Arguments.
Arg. 1. If we are guilty of Adam's first sin, on that account, because we were seminally in him, and are propagated from him, then are we guilty of our nearer Parents sins on the same account. But the antecedent is true: go. so is the consequent.
Arg. 1. If we are guilty of Adam's first sin, on that account, because we were seminally in him, and are propagated from him, then are we guilty of our neerer Parents sins on the same account. But the antecedent is true: go. so is the consequent.
Here I suppose it granted that Adam's first sin is imputed to us, and we guilty of it: for I now deal not with those Divines that deny it, but with those that maintain it: