A27059:329
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I conclude therefore that it is most certain that there is in man some sufficient ground or cause why God's Law should denominate or judge him guilty before it do so. And this cause can be no other than one of these ⟨p. 177⟩two: either because we were seminally in Adam, and are his children; or because God making his covenant as the Rector of all mankind, did make it upon supposition of a virtual consent contained in the very nature of man, and so supposing that what we ought to do, we would do, and that if all men had then existed, we ought to have consented to venture our felicity upon Adam's act, and to run the hazard• of perishing with him, on condition we might be saved with him if he stand; and so such a supposed consent is the ground of our guilt. But, though I will not exclude this last ground, yet certainly it is upon a supposition of the former, or else it is none at all. For man was not to exist till the fall was past, and therefore could not be supposed to exist. And if God had decreed to create every individual person to the end of the World, of nothing, as he did Adam, without any derivation from him; what virtual consent can be supposed? or on what ground should it be presupposed that we would all consent to live and die with him, any more than with the Angels that fell? or any more than the good Angels might be supposed to consent to such a thing? I conclude therefore that the first ground of our interest in Adam's sin, or our guilt of it, is our being his off-spring, and then ⟨p. 178⟩seminally in him; and next, that God might make one Law for him and all that should come of him, as supposing the equity of their consent: yet by that Law, he hath not (that I know of) involved them in his first sin any more than in his second or third; nor offered them happiness merely on condition of his avoiding that first sin, whatsoever they should afterwards do themselves; nor yet promised to make them impeccable, or prevent all after sin.
I conclude therefore that it is most certain that there is in man some sufficient ground or cause why God's Law should denominate or judge him guilty before it do so. And this cause can be no other than one of these ⟨p. 177⟩two: either because we were seminally in Adam, and are his children; or because God making his covenant as the Rector of all mankind, did make it upon supposition of a virtual consent contained in the very nature of man, and so supposing that what we ought to do, we would do, and that if all men had then existed, we ought to have consented to venture our felicity upon Adam's act, and to run the hazard of perishing with him, on condition we might be saved with him if he stand; and so such a supposed consent is the ground of our guilt. But, though I will not exclude this last ground, yet certainly it is upon a supposition of the former, or else it is none at all. For man was not to exist till the fall was past, and therefore could not be supposed to exist. And if God had decreed to create every individual person to the end of the World, of nothing, as he did Adam, without any derivation from him; what virtual consent can be supposed? or on what ground should it be presupposed that we would all consent to live and die with him, any more than with the Angels that fell? or any more than the good Angels might be supposed to consent to such a thing? I conclude therefore that the first ground of our interest in Adam's sin, or our guilt of it, is our being his off-spring, and then