A27059:356
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Arg. 7. None can be naturally the propagators of a nature better than their own, (or a person better than themselves.) But if Parents who are manifoldly guilty of death did propagate a nature not guilty, then should they propagate a nature (or person) better than their own: go.
Here I must explain my meaning, by distinguishing of evil positive (if such be) and privative: Between evils adhering to our nature or essence, and those that adhere but to some integral part: Between a total privation and a partial: Between a privation real or physical, and relative. And so I conclude that, 1. I speak not here of positive evil, as such, (if such there be,) but of privative. 2. I speak not of every evil that adhereth only to some part, and not to nature it self. For I know a lame man may beget a Son not lame, and a sick man may beget a sound child. 3. Nor do I speak of such a partial privation which may consist with the prevalency of the contrary; and which nature may supply, or overcome. 4. Nor yet of a privation of some physical good, (though that be another part of our unhappiness,) but of a relation or right. ⟨p. 190⟩5. Nor of a privation accidentally accruing to the person, and limited to himself alone by the will […] another; but of one that is without any such limitation, naturally, or by necessary resultancy fallen upon him.
Here I must explain my meaning, by distinguishing of evil positive (if such be) and privative: Between evils adhering to our nature or essence, and those that adhere but to some integral part: Between a total privation and a partial: Between a privation real or physical, and relative. And so I conclude that, 1. I speak not here of positive evil, as such, (if such there be,) but of privative. 2. I speak not of every evil that adhereth only to some part, and not to nature it self. For I know a lame man may beget a Son not lame, and a sick man may beget a sound child. 3. Nor do I speak of such a partial privation which may consist with the prevalency of the contrary; and which nature may supply, or overcome. 4. Nor yet of a privation of some physical good, (though that be another part of our unhappiness,) but of a relation or right.