A27059:358
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Furthermore it must be observed; 1. that the guilt that we now speak of is no natural being, but a relative, and that not proper and complete, but, as we may call it, a privative relation, participating of the nature of a proper relation but little more than a natural privation doth of natural being. A right to life is a true relation, which by sin we are deprived of: yet because there is not only the non debitum habendi, but the debitum non habendi, I will not deny but even in this privation there is a kind of relatio rationis. 2. Observe that we are not now speaking of the duness of positive torments; for I say nothing of that in this point of guilt of progenitors sins. 3. Note that many learned Philosophers and Divines affirm that all evil is a privation of good formally; (see Barlow's Exercit. de Natura Mali.) And if that hold, then it seems that our Parents sins do bring upon us a guilt of all evil of punishment: for when they have forfeited all good, they can convey no right of any to us. 4. Note also, that right to blessedness more or less, doth not adhere to the ⟨p. 191⟩nature of man as man; (for then those in Hell should have it:) but it is a separable thing, depending on the will of God: And therefore our Parents may convey our nature, without any right to such blessings. 5. When I say that it is naturally, and by necessary resultancy, that a sinner is thus guilty, I do not exclude God's free will as the antecedent cause in making Nature it self, and the Law: but the indifferency, or non-necessity of the effect when the causes are once in nature thus laid. God might have chosen to have made man such as he is, that is, man: and having so made him, whether he might have chosen to make him that Law which we call the Law of nature, I will not now dispute; (though I think not: because that Law of nature is nothing but the very nature of man himself, considered as related to God, and withal the nature of the whole creation; which all per modum signi do show man the will of God concerning what shall be due from man, and to man.) But this is clear, that God having freely made man in that relation, and under that Law as he did, his breach of that Law doth then by a natural necessity bring him under guilt: for if the subjectum, fundamentum & terminus be put in being, the relation cannot be avoided; for that were a contradiction.
Furthermore it must be observed; 1. that the guilt that we now speak of is no natural being, but a relative, and that not proper and compleat, but, as we may call it, a privative relation, participating of the nature of a proper relation but little more than a natural privation doth of natural being. A right to life is a true relation, which by sin we are deprived of: yet because there is not only the non debitum habendi, but the debitum non habendi, I will not deny but even in this privation there is a kind of relatio rationis. 2. Observe that we are not now speaking of the duness of positive torments; for I say nothing of that in this point of guilt of progenitors sins. 3. Note that many learned Philosophers and Divines affirm that all evil is a privation of good formally; (see Barlow's Exercit. de Natura Mali.) And if that hold, then it seems that our Parents sins do bring upon us a guilt of all evil of punishment: for when they have forfeited all good, they can convey no right of any to us. 4. Note also, that right to blessedness more or less, doth not adhere to the