A27059:370
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of…
Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our nearer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tully / by Richard Baxter.Two disputations of original sin I. of original sin as from Adam, II. of original sin as from our neerer parents : written long ago for a more private use, and now published (with a preface) upon the invitation of Dr. T. Tullie / by Richard Baxter.
London: printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Obj. God doth inflict sufferings on the beasts for mans sin, without any cause on their part: go. he may do so by infants.
Answ. 1. God is not the Rector of Beasts in a moral proper sense; but only in a natural improper sense, as a Pilot ruleth a Ship, or an Herdsman Cattle: And therefore he hath made no Law for them, nor hath engaged ⟨p. 198⟩his fidelity to them concerning the conditions of their happiness or misery, as he hath done to man: And therefore brutes are not capable of sin or punishment, though they be of suffering. So that children's case and theirs do differ. 2. Yet when the brutes suffer for mans sin, it is because of their relation to man: And therefore children must suffer because of their relation, which is natural, and so near that it makes them truly capable of guilt. So that according to the subject, the same suffering receives a various form and denomination, and so doth the obligation. In the personal committers of the sin, there is guilt and punishment due to them, in the primary, fullest, and most proper sense: on the children that were then in their loins, it is guilt and punishment, more imperfectly, as by analogy of attribution: in the brutes, when sacrificed, or destroyed for their Masters sin, it is but equivocally guilt and punishment.
Answ. 1. God is not the Rector of Beasts in a moral proper sense; but only in a natural improper sense, as a Pilot ruleth a Ship, or an Herdsman Cattel: And therefore he hath made no Law for them, nor hath engaged ⟨p. 198⟩his fidelity to them concerning the conditions of their happiness or misery, as he hath done to man: And therefore bruits are not capable of sin or punishment, though they be of suffering. So that childrens case and theirs do differ. 2. Yet when the bruits suffer for mans sin, it is because of their relation to man: And therefore children must suffer because of their relation, which is natural, and so neer that it makes them truly capable of guilt. So that according to the subject, the same suffering receives a various form and denomination, and so doth the obligation. In the personal committers of the sin, there is guilt and punishment due to them, in the primary, fullest, and most proper sense: on the children that were then in their loins, it is guilt and punishment, more imperfectly, as by analogy of attribution: in the bruits, when sacrificed, or destroyed for their Masters sin, it is but equivocally guilt and punishment.