A30189:218
An answer to two treatises of Mr. John Can, the leader of the English…An answer to two treatises of Mr. Iohn Can, the leader of the English…
An answer to two treatises of Mr. John Can, the leader of the English Brownists in Amsterdam the former called, A necessity of separation from the Church of England, proved by the Nonconformists principles : the other, A stay against straying : wherein in opposition to M. John Robinson, he undertakes to prove the unlawfulness of hearing the ministers of the Church of England ... / by the late learned, laborious and faithful servant of Jesus Christ, John Ball.An answer to two treatises of Mr. Iohn Can, the leader of the English Brownists in Amsterdam the former called, A necessitie of separation from the Church of England, proved by the Nonconformists principles : the other, A stay against straying : wherein in opposition to M. Iohn Robinson, he undertakes to prove the unlawfulnesse of hearing the ministers of the Church of England ... / by the late learned, laborious and faithfull servant of Jesus Christ, John Ball.
London: printed by R.B., 1642
Chapter 1 › Section 4 › Can. Stay. Sect. 3. Pag. 20.21. › ANSWER.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The Philosophical Maxim to which you have reference is. 1Posito une contrariorum ponitur & alterum. But as you cite it, It is as hard to be found as your translation is to be understood. That it is not universal, appeareth out of Arist. himself, who putteth down the contrary Maxim as true and certaine. 2Non necessarium est, Si contrariorum alterum sit & alterum esse. Nam si omnes sint sanitas quidem erit, morbus non erit. So in the first Creation of all things, all things were very good and there was nothing evil. All things created are finite in act, but amongst things created there neither is nor can be a natural infinite. Truth and false-hood, good and evil, Piety, and Idolatry are opposite, and that before ever false-hood, evil or Idolatry had any being in the world. Contraries we know expel one another, Or if one be necessary in the subject the other cannot be in it, at least in the intense degree, as if fire be hot it cannot be cold; Now it is necessary, that every thing created be finite and good as created, and therefore good had a being before evil. If it be objected, that opposites are relatives, and relatives are together in nature, the answer is, they are relatives secundum dici, as they speak, not secundum esse, which may be said to be together in nature; Not that both are in act existent out of their causes, but because the nature of one being known the nature of the other may be known, whether it be, or be not, whether it may be or may not be. We know likewise, that not only good is opposed to evil, but evil to evil, as covetousness to prodigality and this the Philosopher himself confesseth. So that these propositions must be rightly limited or they are both false.3
The Philosophicall Maxime to which you have reference is. 1Posito une contrariorum ponitur & alterum. But as you cite it, It is as hard to be found as your translation is to be understood. That it is not universall, appeareth out of Arist. himselfe, who putteth down the contrary Maxime as true and certaine. 2Non necessarium est, Si contrariorum alterum sit & alterum esse. Nam si omnes sint sanitas quidem erit, morbus non erit. So in the first Creation of all things, all things were very good and there was nothing evill. All things created are finite in act, but amongst things created there neither is nor can be a naturall infinite. Truth and false-hood, good and evill, Piety, and Idolatry are opposite, and that before ever false-hood, evill or Idolatry had any being in the world. Contraries we know expell one another, Or if one be necessary in the subject the other cannot be in it, at least in the intense degree, as if fire be hot it cannot be cold; Now it is necessary, that every thing created be finite and good as created, and therefore good had a being before evill. If it be objected, that opposites are relatives, and relatives are together in nature, the answer is, they are relatives secundum dici, as they speake, not secundum esse, which may bee said to be together in nature; Not that both are in act existent out of their causes, but because the nature of one being knowne the nature of the other may be knowne, whether it be, or be not, whether it may bee or may not bee. Wee know likewise, that not only good is opposed to evill, but evill to evill, as covetousnesse to prodigality and this the Philosopher himselfe confesseth. So that these propositions must be rightly limited or they are both false.