Reprobation asserted, or, The doctrine of eternal election & reprobation promiscuously handled in eleven…

Object. But still the Question is, Whether God by this his determination doth not lay a necessity on the Creature to sin? For, No Sin, no Condemnation: This is true by your own Assertion.

Answ. No, by no means: For, 1. Though it be true, that Sin must of absolute necessity go before the infallible condemnation and overthrow of the Sinner; and that it must also be pre-considered by God; yet it needs not lay a necessity upon him to sin: for let him but alone to do what he will, and the Determination cannot be more infallible then the Sin, which is the cause of its Execution. 2. As it needs not, so it doth not; for this positive Determination is not grounded upon what God will effect, but on what the Creature will; and that not through the instigation of God, but the instigation of the Devil. What? might not I, if I most undoubtedly foresaw that such a Tree in my Garden would only cumber the ground (notwithstanding reasonable means) might not I, I say, from hence determine (seven years before) to cut it down, and burn it in the fire, but I must, by so determining, necessitate this Tree to be fruitless? The case in hand is the very same. God therefore may most positively determine the infallible damnation of his Creature, and yet not at all necessitate the Creature to sin, that he might be damned.

Answ. No, by no means: For, 1. Though it be true, that Sin must of absolute necessity go before the infallible condemnation and overthrow of the Sinner; and that it must also be pre-considered by God; yet it needs not lay a necessity upon him to sin: for let him but alone to do what he will, and the Determination cannot be more infallible then the Sin, which is the cause of its Execution. 2. As it needs not, so it doth not; for this positive Determination is not grounded upon what God will effect, but on what the Creature will; and that not thorow the instiga•ion of God, but the instigation of the Devil. What? might not I, if I most undoubtedly foresaw that such a Tree in my Garden would onely cumber the ground (notwithstanding reasonable means) might not I, I say, from hence determine (seven years before) to cut it down, and burn it in the fire, but I must, by so determining, necessitate this Tree to be fruitless? The case in hand is the very same. God therefore may most positively determine the infallible damnation of his Creature, and yet not at all necessitate the Creature to sin, that he might be damned.