A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is

But certainly, as scientia is sometimes taken for that which is by way of a principle or habit in man, and sometimes for that which is by way of act; So also it is with conscience, it taketh into its nature both that practical habit (called by Aristotle, Intellectus, or the habit of first principles) and also the actual application of them, for if conscience were not habitual, as well as in act; There were no conscience in men when they are asleep, which yet cannot be denied unto regenerate persons: So that as in Scripture, saith and love are taken sometimes for the habit of those graces, sometimes for the acts of them; so also conscience is taken both for the principle, and the act it self; For to the acting of conscience there is required (as all observe) a practical Syllogism: Thus, Whosoever is a fornicator, a drunkard, a curser, cannot inherit the kingdom of God: But I am such a sinner: Therefore I cannot inherit the kingdom of God. Or on the contrary, To him that believeth, and is of a broken contrite heart, pardon of sin is promised: But I believe and am of a broken heart: Therefore to me pardon of sin is promised. Thus conscience is well called the practical understanding, for whereas the speculative hath for its object, that which is merely true; this looketh upon it as ordinable to action, as such a truth is to be brought into particular application. To every acting then of conscience completely, there is required a Syllogism, either interpretative or formal; And as Dr. Ames saith well, Conscience in the major Proposition is Lex, in the Assumption it is Testis, in the Conclusion it is Judex. In the first Proposition, there it is by way of a Law, dictating such a thing to be true; In the Minor it is a Witness, bearing witness either against or for our selves; And lastly, it is a Judge passing sentence according to the premisses; And in that it is called conscience it doth relate to another, a knowledge with another, that is either our selves; so that conscience in its actings is conceived as a person, as it were, distinct from us, and so that witnesseth with our hearts, what we are, and what we have done;

But certainly, as scientia is sometimes taken for that which is by way of a principle or habit in man, and sometimes for that which is by way of act; So also it is with conscience, it taketh into its nature both that practical habit (called by Aristotle, Intellectus, or the habit of first principles) and also the actual application of them, for if conscience were not habitual, as well as in act; There were no conscience in men when they are asleep, which yet cannot be denied unto regenerate persons: So that as in Scripture, saith and love are taken sometimes for the habit of those graces, sometimes for the acts of them; so also conscience is taken both for the principle, and the act it self; For to the acting of conscience there is required (as all observe) a practical Syllogisme: Thus, Whosoever is a fornicator, a drunkard, a curser, cannot inherit the kingdom of God: But I am such a sinner: Therefore I cannot inherit the kingdom of God. Or on the contrary, To him that believeth, and is of a broken contrite heart, pardon of sinne is promised: But I believe and am of a broken heart: Therefore to me pardon of sinne is promised. Thus conscience is well called the practical understanding, for whereas the speculative hath for its object, that which is meerly true; this looketh upon it as ordinable to action, as such a truth is to be brought into particular application. To every acting then of conscience compleatly, there is required a Syllogisme, either interpretative or formal; And as Dr. Ames saith well, Conscience in the major Proposition is Lex, in the Assumption it is Testis, in the Conclusion it is Judex. In the first Proposition, there it is by way of a Law, dictating such a thing to be true; In the Minor it is a Witnesse, bearing witness either against or for our selves; And lastly, it is a Judge passing sentence according to the premisses; And in that it is called conscience it doth relate to another, a knowledge with another, that is either our selves; so that conscience in its actings is conceived as a person, as it were, distinct from us, and so that witnesseth with our hearts, what we are, and what we have done;