A30247:1339
A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is
A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is, by pregnant texts of Scripture vindicated from false glosses / by Anthony Burgess.
London : s.n., 1658
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Hence if a mans conscience lay a sin to his charge, though all the world free, him, yet he beareth ⟨p. 224⟩guilt and terror about with him, Quid proderit tibi non habere conscium habenti conscientiam, or else, which is more probable, it is called conscience, or knowledge with, in respect of God: So that in the actings of conscience, there is a sense and apprehension of the knowledge of God, and his presence; Therefore conscience doth always bear some aspect to God, this God will see, this God will punish, this God hath forbidden, and therefore let me betime take heed how I do it; So that while conscience hath any stirrings and vigorous actings there is some hope in a man. Although it be thus generally received by all, that conscience belongs to the understanding, yet Durand makes it something probable (Lib. 2. Distinct. 39. Quast. 4.) That if it be not the will, yet the will is necessarily included in the workings of conscience, so that conscience doth denote understanding and will also; For that act of conscience which is called remordere, to bite and sting a man, to make him grieve and be sad upon the committing of sin, must flow from the will.
Hence if a mans conscience lay a sinne to his charge, though all the world free, him, yet he beareth ⟨p. 224⟩guilt and terrour about with him, Quid proderit tibi non habere conscium habenti conscientiam, or else, which is more probable, it is called conscience, or knowledge with, in respect of God: So that in the actings of conscience, there is a sense and apprehension of the knowledge of God, and his presence; Therefore conscience doth alwayes bear some aspect to God, this God will see, this God will punish, this God hath forbidden, and therefore let me betime take heed how I do it; So that while conscience hath any stirrings and vigorous actings there is some hope in a man. Although it be thus generally received by all, that conscience belongs to the understanding, yet Durand makes it something probable (Lib. 2. Distinct. 39. Quast. 4.) That if it be not the will, yet the will is necessarily included in the workings of conscience, so that conscience doth denote understanding and will also; For that act of conscience which is called remordere, to bite and sting a man, to make him grieve and be sad upon the committing of sinne, must flow from the will.