A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is

Prop. 3. The reason why Infants have not the actual use of reason, as soon as they are born ariseth not from their soul, but the constitution of their bodies; As in natural fools, mad men, or men in sleep, there is no defect in their souls, but in the body, which is the organical instrument of the soul; Therefore when Infants die, as soon as ever their souls are separated from the body, they have perfect knowledge and reason; but the want of the use of reason ariseth from the abundance and overflowing of humours, whereby the sensitive powers of the soul are make indisposed for their operations.

Prop. 3. The reason why Infants have not the actual use of reason, as soon as they are born ariseth not from their soult, but the constitution of their bodies; As in natural fools, mad men, or men in sleep, there is no defect in their souls, but in the body, which is the organical instrument of the soul; Therefore when Infants die, as soon as ever their souls are seperated from the body, they have perfect knowledge and reason; but the want of the use of reason ariseth from the abundance and overflowing of humours, whereby the sensitive powers of the soul are make indisposed for their operations.

Prop. 4. Seeing therefore that the soul cometh to work rationally by the successive alteration of the complexion of the body, as the organs are disposed, which in some is sooner, in some later, it is impossible to give not only the metaphysical indivisible instant, but even the moral time wherein a child doth first begin to have an actual sin. As we cannot observe it in our selves when we first had any use of reason, so neither can we in another; and therefore the limiting of the works of understanding, to the fourth, sixth or seven years, is altogether uncertain, only we are to conclude, That children sin long before they know what sin is, or can understand what it is to offend God, for those peevish […] vexations which are in little ones, even while sucking, are not to be freed […] some kind of guilt, for such things would not have been in the state of innocent•: And if you say, Why should we think those are sins, seeing they do not flew from the use of reason and free-will? Therefore.