A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is

First, Here again God is made the occasion of all the universal impiety in ⟨p. 454⟩mankind: man may plead, my nature is good, my inclinations are lawful, but God hath superinduced austere commands, he maketh those things sins, which would not have been sins; Thus this man doth directly teach the world to lay all their wickedness upon God, he is an hard master, he is too severe, otherwise our natures would do well enough. But

First, Here again God is made the occasion of all the universal impiety in ⟨p. 454⟩mankind: man may plead, my nature is good, my inclinations are lawfull, but God hath superinduced austere commands, he maketh those things sinnes, which would not have been sinnes; Thus this man doth directly teach the world to lay all their wickedness upon God, he is an hard master, he is too severe, otherwise our natures would do well enough. But

Secondly, He betrayeth much ignorance, or concealeth his knowledge, that he will not distinguish between moral precepts, and mere positive ones; or as Whitaker out of Hugo, Pracepta Naturae, and Praecepta Disciplinae (De pecato orig. lib. 1. cap. 14.) commands of Natural Duties, and prohibitions of Intrinsical evils; or such as are merely Positive, and for Discipline-sake. Some things we grant are indeed merely evil, because prohibited; some things are evil, and therefore prohibited. Although this must be remembered, That a man doth never break a positive command, but thereby also he doth a moral command likewise. Now let this Patron of Nature answer to this Question, Why is there in man-kind such inclinations to those sins, that are morally and intrinsically evil? Is he of that opinion, that nothing is good or evil internally? But as Mayro the Schoolman saith, God might have made a Law, that whosoever should praise him should be damned, and whosoever should dishonour him, should be saved. On monstrous Divinity, that maketh virtue and vice nothing in it self! If God had pleased, vices might have been virtues, and virtues vices; It is from God that maketh such things to be sins, that otherwise would be lawful. This symbolizeth with Diagoras the Atheist, first called [Greek or Hebrew], and afterwards [Greek or Hebrew]: for his opinion was, That a wise man might, as time served, give himself to theft or adultery, [Greek or Hebrew] (Hesych. de viris illustribus Titulo [Greek or Hebrew].) for none of such things, were in their nature filthy, if you take away popular opinions. But I will not charge this opinion on the Author, only he should not have spoken so confusedly. If this be true, it is not a vain wish with him, who addicted to a sin, cried out, Utinam hoc non esset peccare!