A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is

Secondly, He betrayeth much ignorance, or concealeth his knowledge, that he will not distinguish between moral precepts, and mere positive ones; or as Whitaker out of Hugo, Pracepta Naturae, and Praecepta Disciplinae (De pecato orig. lib. 1. cap. 14.) commands of Natural Duties, and prohibitions of Intrinsical evils; or such as are merely Positive, and for Discipline-sake. Some things we grant are indeed merely evil, because prohibited; some things are evil, and therefore prohibited. Although this must be remembered, That a man doth never break a positive command, but thereby also he doth a moral command likewise. Now let this Patron of Nature answer to this Question, Why is there in man-kind such inclinations to those sins, that are morally and intrinsically evil? Is he of that opinion, that nothing is good or evil internally? But as Mayro the Schoolman saith, God might have made a Law, that whosoever should praise him should be damned, and whosoever should dishonour him, should be saved. On monstrous Divinity, that maketh virtue and vice nothing in it self! If God had pleased, vices might have been virtues, and virtues vices; It is from God that maketh such things to be sins, that otherwise would be lawful. This symbolizeth with Diagoras the Atheist, first called [Greek or Hebrew], and afterwards [Greek or Hebrew]: for his opinion was, That a wise man might, as time served, give himself to theft or adultery, [Greek or Hebrew] (Hesych. de viris illustribus Titulo [Greek or Hebrew].) for none of such things, were in their nature filthy, if you take away popular opinions. But I will not charge this opinion on the Author, only he should not have spoken so confusedly. If this be true, it is not a vain wish with him, who addicted to a sin, cried out, Utinam hoc non esset peccare!

Secondly, He betrayeth much ignorance, or concealeth his knowledge, that he will not distinguish between moral precepts, and meer positive ones; or as Whitaker out of Hugo, Pracepta Naturae, and Praecepta Disciplinae (De pecato orig. lib. 1. cap. 14.) commands of Natural Duties, and prohibitions of Intrinsecal evils; or such as are meerly Positive, and for Discipline-sake. Some things we grant are indeed meerly evil, because prohibited; some things are evil, and therefore prohibited. Although this must be remembred, That a man doth never break a positive command, but thereby also he doth a moral command likewise. Now let this Patron of Nature answer to this Question, Why is there in man-kind such inclinations to those sins, that are morally and intrinsically evil? Is he of that opinion, that nothing is good or evil internally? But as Mayro the Schoolman saith, God might have made a Law, that whosoever should praise him should be damned, and whosoever should dishonour him, should be saved. On monstrous Divinity, that maketh virtue and vice nothing in it self! If God had pleased, vices might have been virtues, and virtues vices; It is from God that maketh such things to be sins, that otherwise would be lawfull. This symbolizeth with Diagoras the Atheist, first called , and afterwards : for his opinion was, That a wise man might, as time served, give himself to theft or adultery, (Hesych. de viris illustribus Titulo .) for none of such things, were in their nature filthy, if you take away popular opinions. But I will not charge this opinion on the Author, only he should not have spoken so confusedly. If this be true, it is not a vain wish with him, who addicted to a sinne, cryed out, Vtinam hoc non esset peccare!