Propos. 4. Because man is thus tempted, and enticed by lust within, therefore it is that man fallen, doth sin far otherwise, then Adam did in the state of integrity. We do not sin now, as Adam at first; we have an internal cause and principle within us, whereas Adam did sin, wholly from suggestion without; neither was it lust within, but his mere will, that made him consent to such suggestions. This Proposition is the more to be regarded, because Pelagian and Socinian Writers, they all agree in this, That we at first sin in the same manner, as Adam did at first; the sensitive part, being enticed by sensible objects, and so rebelling against the rational part. But this is to be wholly ignorant of that holy estate and glorious Image, wherein God created Adam at first. Adam had all such external and internal helps, so freed from all ignorance, passion or lust, that nothing could destroy him, but the liberty and mutability of his will. Whereas alas in man destitute of Gods Image, there is a lusting principle within him, carrying him out inordinately unto every object proposed. It is therefore a false and an absurd Position, which Molina the Jesuit, one of the mere Naturalists affirmeth (Quaest. 14. Disput. 4. de Concord. lib. Arb.) where he saith, Adam had, Innatum appetitum excellentiae ac laudis quo ad intellectum & voluntatem, &c. That he had this temptation within him, viz. an innate appetite to his own excellency and praise. For how could this consist with that holiness and righteousness God created him in? Indeed he saith in another place of the same book (Quaest. 14. Disp. 45.) Ex contemplation rei amabilis, &c) from the contemplation of any lovely object, and which is of concernment to be obtained, there doth naturally rise in the will a certain motion, whereby the will is affected to it; which motion is not a volition, but an affection of the will to that object, whose goodness it is allured with. And this he maketh to be in men, yea in the Angels before they fell: But what is this but to say, that in men and Angels, even before their fall, there was a concupiscential inclination to delightsome objects: and so Adam and Angels must according to this Text be tempted away, and enticed by their own lusts? An horrible Position, highly derogating from Gods honour, who created them holy and righteous.
Propos. 4. Because man is thus tempted, and enticed by lust within, therefore it is that man fallen, doth sinne farre otherwise, then Adam did in the state of integrity. We do not sinne now, as Adam at first; we have an internal cause and principle within us, whereas Adam did sinne, wholly from suggestion without; neither was it lust within, but his meer will, that made him consent to such suggestions. This Proposition is the more to be regarded, because Pelagian and Socinian Writers, they all agree in this, That we at first sinne in the same manner, as Adam did at first; the sensitive part, being enticed by sensible objects, and so rebelling against the rational part. But this is to be wholly ignorant of that holy estate and glorious Image, wherein God created Adam at first. Adam had all such external and internal helps, so freed from all ignorance, passion or lust, that nothing could destroy him, but the liberty and mutability of his will. Whereas alas in man destitute of Gods Image, there is a lusting principle within him, carrying him out inordinately unto every object proposed. It is therefore a false and an absurd Position, which Molina the Jesuite, one of the meer Naturalists affirmeth (Quaest. 14. Disput. 4. de Concord. lib. Arb.) where he saith, Adam had, Innatum appetitum excellentiae ac laudis quo ad intellectum & voluntatem, &c. That he had this temptation within him, viz. an innate appetite to his own excellency and praise. For how could this consist with that holiness and righteousness God created him in? Indeed he saith in another place of the same book (Quaest. 14. Disp. 45.) Ex contemplation rei amabilis, &c) from the contemplation of any lovely object, and which is of concernment to be obtained, there doth naturally rise in the will a certain motion, whereby the will is affected to it; which motion is not a volition, but an affection of the will to that object, whose goodness it is allured with. And this he maketh to be in men, yea in the Angels before they fell: But what is this but to say, that in men and Angels, even before their fall, there was a concupiscential inclination to delightsome objects: and so Adam and Angels must according to this Text be tempted away, and enticed by their own lusts? An horrible Position, highly derogating from Gods honour, who created them holy and righteous.
