A treatise of original sin ... proving that it is

¶. 3.

WE are to lay it down for a certain foundation to build upon (as hath formerly been delivered) That this spiritual conflict was not in the state of integrity. Adam before his fall could not find such a rebellion in him; for if so, this would greatly have interrupted all his blessedness; and withal such a duel within him, and that necessarily flowing from his creation, would have redounded to the great dishonour of God his Maker. Now the Adversaries of original sin, whether Papists, Remonstrants or Socinians, who do usually traduce the orthodox Doctrine about it, as if horribly injurious to God, do in this particular far transcend all such supposed reflections, either upon the justice or mercy of God. For they do boldly affirm, That by the very natural constitution of man, there is a necessary conflict between the rational and sensitive part; only say the Papists, original righteousness (which the Socinian derideth as much as original sin) did keep down this repugnancy, so that Adam had not any actual rebellion within, though it was there potentially and radically. Thus Soto (though Stapleton fluctuateth, and seemeth to be his Adversary therein) expressly affirmeth (Lib. de Naturâ & Gratiâ, c. 3.) that the conflict mentioned by the Apostle, Gal. 5. 17. is Homini â naturâ ingenita, inbred in the very nature of a man, which he would prove from a philosophical Discourse out of Aristotle, who divideth man into two parts: his rational and sensitive, adding that the sensitive part obeyeth the rational, not despotically, as servants who have no right of their own do to their masters (for so the members of the body only do serve the mind) but politically and civilly, as a Citizen doth his Prince, in whose power it is to disobey. But as Aristotle knew nothing of mans creation, or the Image of God put upon him, nor of his fall, and the utter depravation of mans soul thereby, so it would be absurd to run to his darkness to fetch light about these things. Hence also it is, that the same Author (Cap. 13.) in another place, compareth man fallen with man standing to some weighty piece, that hangeth on high, but is hindered that it cannot fall; and the same piece, when the impediment is removed. For as such a piece of timber had the same proneness to fall to the ground, while it was hindered, as when the obstacle was removed, only it did not actually fall: