The first combat is, That which may be in Heathens, between their conscience and their appetite. The light of nature inclining one way, and their lust another way, which is notably taken notice of by Aristotle; a man in such a conflict is called by him an incontinent person, as distinct from an intemperate, who having the habit of sin, is carried out to the actings thereof without any remorse or regretings of conscience or reason. To clear this, he speaketh of a two-fold ⟨p. 501⟩part of the soul, the rational, and that which hath not reason, or which doth repugn reason. The rational part (saith he, Lib. 1. Ethic. cap. 13.) [Greek or Hebrew], doth provoke and incite to what is good; but the rebellious part gain-sayeth. Even as in the paralytical parts of the body, when a man would move such to the right side, they fall to the left side. Now this Discourse of Aristotle's we acknowledge, as having some truth, for even Heathens have by nature their consciences accusing or excusing of them, Rom. 2. 15. But Papists and others do horribly pervert this, when they bring it into Divinity, and so put a new piece of garment into the old, thereby making a rent, because there is no agreement with them; otherwise we grant such a combat: yea it is in too many men, whose convictions are strong, but their lusts stronger; and no doubt this is in a regenerate person so far, as nature still abideth in him; but such mens dislike and renitency of conscience doth not excuse them, though they be not such great sinners, as those that sin without any remorse, yet their condition is damnable. Though such have many good sentences, and you shall hear many good speeches come from them, yet they are still under the bondage of sin; for though they have a knowledge condemning their sin, yet it is but universal; when they come to the particular, then they are carried away, or their knowledge is but habitually in them, not actually; as with drunken men, or men in a sleep; so that the good sayings they utter, they have no practical application of them, and therefore compared by Aristotle (Lib. 7.) to a City, which was derided by this saying, [Greek or Hebrew], The City consulteth and adviseth, that yet regardeth not Laws, or like such who did utter Empedocles his grave sentences. A sad thing it is:
The first combate is, That which may be in Heathens, between their conscience and their appetite. The light of nature inclining one way, and their lust another way, which is notably taken notice of by Aristotle; a man in such a conflict is called by him an incontinent person, as distinct from an intemperate, who having the habit of sinne, is carried out to the actings thereof without any remorse or regretings of conscience or reason. To clear this, he speaketh of a two-fold ⟨p. 501⟩part of the soul, the rational, and that which hath not reason, or which doth repugn reason. The rational part (saith he, Lib. 1. Ethic. cap. 13.) 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, doth provoke and incite to what is good; but the rebellious part gain-sayeth. Even as in the paralytical parts of the body, when a man would move such to the right side, they fall to the left side. Now this Discourse of Aristotles we acknowledge, as having some truth, for even Heathens have by nature their consciences accusing or excusing of them, Rom. 2. 15. But Papists and others do horribly perve•t this, when they bring it into Divinity, and so put a new piece of garment into the old, thereby making a rent, because there is no agreement with them; otherwise we grant such a combate: yea it is in too many men, whose convictions are strong, but their lusts stronger; and no doubt this is in a regenerate person so farre, as nature still abideth in him; but such mens dislike and renitency of conscience doth not excuse them, though they be not such great sinners, as those that sinne without any remorse, yet their condition is damnable. Though such have many good sentences, and you shall hear many good speeches come from them, yet they are still under the bondage of sinne; for though they have a knowledge condemning their sinne, yet it is but universal; when they come to the particular, then they are carried away, or their knowledge is but habitually in them, not actually; as with drunken men, or men in a sleep; so that the good sayings they utter, they have no practical application of them, and therefore compared by Aristotle (Lib. 7.) to a City, which was derided by this saying, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, The City consulteth and adviseth, that yet regardeth not Laws, or like such who did utter Empedocles his grave sentences. A sad thing it is:
