A30248:274
The true doctrine of justification asserted and vindicated, from the errors of Papists, Arminians,…The true doctrine of justification asserted and vindicated, from the errours of Papists, Arminians,…
The true doctrine of justification asserted and vindicated, from the errors of Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and more especially Antinomians in XXX lectures preached at Lawrence-Jury, London / by Anthony Burgess ...The true doctrine of justification asserted and vindicated, from the errours of Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and more especially Antinomians in XXX lectures preached at Lawrence-Iury, London / by Anthony Burgess ...
London: printed by A. Miller for Tho. Underhill, 1651
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Propos. 4. In respect of Gods liberty and freedom, 1there is great difference between the attributes of God, as also the exercises and actions of them. There are some properties that require no object for their exercise, but they make it; thus the omnipotency of God, doth not find, but make its object. Again there are others, which though they require an object, yet not any condition, or circumstance in it; so the wisdom of God, can and doth order every object, let it be what it will be, to a glorious end. It ordered an harmonious world out of a Chaos, he made all things, qua omnipotens, as omnipotent, and ordered them all qua sapiens, as a wise God. But then there are other attributes, which though essential to him, yet cannot be exercised, but where the objects are so and so conditionated; as that mercy of God, whereby he doth forgive sins, requireth an object penitent and believing: so that Justice of God, whereby it is punitive and vindicative of sin, requireth an object, that is a sinner and impenitent. Now in the actions about the objects of the former sort, God is every way free, he might have created the world, or not have created it; but in the actions of the latter sort, though he be also free, yet not so as to use Justice, or not Justice, when there is an object with its due condition. As now it was free to God, whether he would make man or no, it was free for him, whether he would permit man to fall or no, but when fallen, not free whether he would be just or no: Thus God is free, whether ⟨p. 98⟩he will procure, or prepare an object of justice; but then when he hath so prepared an object, then he is not loosened from the obligation of Justice. To procure an object of Justice ariseth from the Sovereignty and mere freedom of God: Hence Gods permission of sin, or reprobation negative. which is the passing by of some, are not acts of Justice properly so called; but condemnation for sin is truly and properly Justice. The former arise from Gods supreme dominion and freedom. When an Object of Justice is, there is an obligation to execute the same upon it, but not when an object of mercy is, because its necessary to mercy, that it should be indebita, but to justice, debita.
Propos. 4. In respect of Gods liberty and freedom, 1there is great difference between the attributes of God, as also the exercises and actions of them. There are some properties that require no object for their exercise, but they make it; thus the omnipotency of God, doth not finde, but make its object. Again there are others, which though they require an object, yet not any condition, or circumstance in it; so the wisdom of God, can and doth order every object, let it be what it will be, to a glorious end. It ordered an harmonious world out of a Chaos, he made all things, qua omnipotens, as omnipotent, and ordered them all qua sapiens, as a wise God. But then there are other attributes, which though essential to him, yet cannot be exercised, but where the objects are so and so conditionated; as that mercy of God, whereby he doth forgive sins, requireth an object penitent and believing: so that Justice of God, whereby it is punitive and vindicative of sin, requireth an object, that is a sinner and impenitent. Now in the actions about the objects of the former sort, God is every way free, he might have created the world, or not have created it; but in the actions of the latter sort, though he be also free, yet not so as to use Justice, or not Justice, when there is an object with its due condition. As now it was free to God, whether he would make man or no, it was free for him, whether he would permit man to fall or no, but when fallen, not free whether he would be just or no: Thus God is free, whether