A30249:146
Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the moral law and the covenants, from the…Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the…
Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the moral law and the covenants, from the errors of Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and more especially, Antinomians in XXX lectures, preached at Laurence-Jury, London / by Anthony Burgess ...Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the errours of Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and more especially, Antinomians in XXX lectures, preached at Laurence-Jury, London / by Anthony Burgess ...
London: printed by James Young for Thomas Underhill, 1647
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Thirdly, let us take notice how the Antinomian explaineth this place, and what he means by this Text. The old Antinomian, Islebius Agricola, states the question thus: Whether the Law be to a righteous man as a teacher, ruler, commander, and requirer of obedience actively: Or, Whether the righteous man doth indeed the works of the Law, but that is passivè; the Law is wrought by him, but the Law doth not work on him. So then, the question is not, Whether the things of the Law be done, (for they say the righteous man is active to the Law, and not that to him) but, Whether, when these things are done, they are done by a godly man, admonished, instructed, and commanded by the Law of God: And this they deny. As for the later Antinomian, he speaketh very uncertainly, and inconsistently: Sometimes he grants the Law is a Rule, but very hardly and seldom; then presently kicketh all down again: For, saith he, it cannot be conceived that it should rule, but also it should reign; and therefore think it impossible, that one act of the Law should be without the other. The damnatory power of the Law is inseparable from it: Can you put your conscience under the mandatory power, and yet keep it from the damnatory? (Assertion of Grace page 33. Again, the same Author, page 31.) If it be true that the Law cannot condemn, it is no more a Law, saith Luther. I say not that you have dealt as uncourteously with the Law, as did that King with Davids servants, who cut off their garments by the midst: but you have done worse, for even, Joab-like, under friendly words, you have destroyed the life and soul of the Law. You can as well take your Appendices from the Law, as you term them, and yet let it remain a true Law; as you can take the brains and heart of a man, and yet leave him a man still. By this it appeareth, that if the Law doth not curse a man, neither can it command a man, according to their opinion. The same Author again, pag. 5. He dare not trust a believer to walk without his keeper [the Law,] as if he judged no otherwise of him then of a malefactor in Newgate, who would kill and rob if his Jailer were not with him: Thus they are only kept within the compass of the Law, but are not keepers of it. Yet, at another time, the same Author calls it a slander, to say, that they deny the Law. Now, who can reconcile these contradictions?
Thirdly, let us take notice how the Antinomian explaineth this place, and what he meanes by this Text. The old Antinomian, Islebius Agricola, states the question thus: Whether the Law be to a righteous man as a teacher, ruler, commander, and requirer of obedience actively: Or, Whether the righteous man doth indeed the works of the Law, but that is passivè; the Law is wrought by him, but the Law doth not work on him. So then, the question is not, Whether the things of the Law be done, (for they say the righteous man is active to the Law, and not that to him) but, Whether, when these things are done, they are done by a godly man, admonished, instructed, and commanded by the Law of God: And this they deny. As for the later Antinomian, he speaketh very uncertainly, and inconsistently: Sometimes he grants the Law is a Rule, but very hardly and seldome; then presently kicketh all down again: For, saith he, it cannot be conceived that it should rule, but also it should reigne; and therefore think it impossible, that one act of the Law should be without the other. The damnatory power of the Law is inseparable from it: Can you put your conscience under the mandatory power, and yet keep it from the damnatory? (Assertion of Grace page 33. Again, the same Author, page 31.) If it be true that the Law cannot condemne, it is no more a Law, saith Luther. I say not that you have dealt as uncourteously with the Law, as did that King with Davids servants, who cut off their garments by the midst: but you have done worse, for even, Joab-like, under friendly words, you have destroyed the life and soule of the Law. You can as well take your Appendices from the Law, as you terme them, and yet let it remain a true Law; as you can take the brains and heart of a man, and yet leave him a man still. By this it appeareth, that if the Law doth not curse a man, neither can it command a man, according to their opinion. The same Author again, pag. 5. He dare not trust a beleever to walk without his keeper [the Law,] as if he judged no otherwise of him then of a malefactor in Newgate, who would kill and rob if his Jaylor were not with him: Thus they are onely kept within the compasse of the Law, but are not keepers of it. Yet, at another time, the same Author calls it a slander, to say, that they deny the Law. Now, who can reconcile these contradictions?