Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the moral law and the covenants, from the…Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the…

In the next place there are two Consequents of the Law which are ad bene esse, that the Law may be the better obeyed; and this indeed turneth the law into a covenant, which is another notion upon it, as afterwards is to be shown. Now as for the sanction of the law by way of a promise, that is a mere free thing; God, by reason of that dominion which he had over man, might have commanded his obedience, and yet never have made a promise of eternal life unto him. And as for the other consequent act of the law, to curse, and punish, this is but an accidental act, and not necessary to a law; for it cometh in upon supposition of transgression: and therefore, as we may say of a Magistrate, He was a just and complete Magistrate for his time, though he put forth no punitive justice, if there be no malefactors offending; so it is about a law, a law is a complete law obliging, though it do not actually curse: as in the confirmed Angels, it never had any more then obligatory, and mandatory acts upon them; for that they were under a law is plain, because otherwise they could not have sinned, for where there is no law, there is no transgression. If therefore the Antinomian were rectified ¹in this principle, which is very true and plain, he would ⟨p. 62⟩quickly be satisfied: but of this more in another place. But we come to the particulars of the doctrine, the pressing of which will serve much against the Antinomian. Therefore, for the better understanding of this Law of Nature, consider these particulars:

In the next place there are two Consequents of the Law which are ad bene esse, that the Law may be the better obeyed; and this indeed turneth the law into a covenant, which is another notion upon it, as afterwards is to be shewn. Now as for the sanction of the law by way of a promise, that is a meere free thing; God, by reason of that dominion which he had over man, might have commanded his obedience, and yet never have made a promise of eternall life unto him. And as for the other consequent act of the law, to curse, and punish, this is but an accidentall act, and not necessary to a law; for it cometh in upon supposition of trangression: and therefore, as we may say of a Magistrate, He was a just and compleat Magistrate for his time, though he put forth no punitive justice, if there be no malefactors offending; so it is about a law, a law is a compleat law oblieging, though it do not actually curse: as in the confirmed Angels, it never had any more then obligatory, and mandatory acts upon them; for that they were under a law is plaine, because otherwise they could not have sinned, for where there is no law, there is no transgression. If therefore the Antinomian were rectified