Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the moral law and the covenants, from the…Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the…

1. That hereby Gods dominion and power over man might be the more acknowledged: for to obey the natural law, might be a necessary condition, and not an act of the Will: Even as the Heathens do abstain from many sins, not because forbidden by God, but as dissonant to their natural reason. And even among Christians there is a great deal of difference between good actions, that are done because God commands, and because of a natural conscience. These two principles make the same actions to differ in their whole nature. Therefore God would try Adam by some positive law, that so the dominion and power which God had over him might be the more eminently held forth: and therefore Adam in this was not to consider the greatness or goodness of the matter, but the will of the commander.

1. That hereby Gods dominion and power over man might be the more acknowledged: for to obey the naturall law, might be a necessary condition, and not an act of the Will: Even as the Heathens doe abstaine from many sins, not because forbidden by God, but as dissonant to their naturall reason. And even among Christians there is a great deale of difference between good actions, that are done because God commands, and because of a naturall conscience. These two principles make the same actions to differ in their whole nature. Therefore God would try Adam by some positive law, that so the dominion and power which God had over him might be the more eminently held forth: and therefore Adam in this was not to consider the greatnesse or goodnesse of the matter, but the will of the commander.

2. Another reason, which floweth from the former, is, that ¹so Adams obedience might be the more tried, and be manifested to be obedience. For, as Austin, speaking of himself in confessing his wickedness, that though he had no need or temptation to sin, yet to be a sinner he delighted in that; Nulla alia causa malitiae, nisi malitia: so on the contrary, it's an excellent aggravation of obedience, when there is nulla alia causa obedientiae, nisi obedientia; so that the forbearing to eat, was not from any sin in the action, but from the will of the law-giver. And Austin doth well explain this: If a man (saith he) forbid another to touch such an herb, because it's poison, this herb is contrary to a mans health, whether it be forbidden or no: Or if a man forbid a thing, because it will be an hinderance to him that forbiddeth; as to take away a mans money, or goods, here it's forbidden, because it would be loss to him that forbiddeth: but if a man forbids that which is neither of these ways hurtful, therefore it's forbidden, because bonum obedientiae per se, & malum inobedientiae per se monstraretur.