Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the moral law and the covenants, from the…Vindiciae legis, or, A vindication of the morall law and the covenants, from the…

2. Let us consider in the next place, what a Covenant doth imply; ¹first in the word, then in the thing signified. For I should deal very imperfectly, if I did not speak something of the general nature of it, though hereafter more may be spoken of. You may therefore take notice, that there are things among men, that do induce a public obligation, that yet do differ: A Law, a Covenant, and a Testament. Now a Law and a Testament, they are absolute, and do not imply any consent of the party under them: As a Law requireth subjection, not attending unto, or expecting the consent of inferiors; and so a Testament, or a Will of man, is to bequeath such goods and legacies unto a man, not expecting a consent. Indeed sometimes such goods are bequeathed with a condition, and so a man may refuse whether he will be executor, or no; but this is accidental to the nature of a Testament. But a Covenant, that differs from the two former, in that it doth require consent and agreement between two parties: and in Divinity, if it be between man entire and upright, it is called by some, A Covenant of friendship; if it be between God and man fallen, it is called, A Covenant of reconciliation. Hence in Covenants, that are not nuda pacta (mere Covenants) but are accompanied with some solemnities, there were stipulations added, which were done by Question and Answer: Do you promise? I promise. Hence it is called [Greek or Hebrew] and we call it Stipulation, from the Latin word, which comes from the Greek word, [Greek or Hebrew], or [Greek or Hebrew], which is as much as [Greek or Hebrew], or [Greek or Hebrew], because these words did make the Covenant valid. As for Isidorus ⟨p. 125⟩his etymology of stipulation, à frangendis stipulis, because, when they promised or entered into an agreement, they brake a stick between them, and then joining it together, so made a promise, and every party kept a piece, as a tally, to maintain their agreement; this is rejected by the learned Salmasius.

2. Let us consider in the next place, what a Covenant doth imply; ¹first in the word, then in the thing signified. For I should deal very imperfectly, if I did not speak something of the generall nature of it, though hereafter more may be spoken of. You may therefore take notice, that there are things among men, that doe induce a publike obligation, that yet doe differ: A Law, a Covenant, and a Testament. Now a Law and a Testament, they are absolute, and doe not imply any consent of the party under them: As a Law requireth subjection, not attending unto, or expecting the consent of inferiours; and so a Testament, or a Will of man, is to bequeath such goods and legacies unto a man, not expecting a consent. Indeed sometimes such goods are bequeathed with a condition, and so a man may refuse whether he will be executor, or no; but this is accidentall to the nature of a Testament. But a Covenant, that differs from the two former, in that it doth require consent and agreement between two parties: and in Divinity, if it be between man entire and upright, it is called by some, A Covenant of friendship; if it be between God and man fallen, it is called, A Covenant of reconciliation. Hence in Covenants, that are not nuda pacta (meer Covenants) but are accompanied with some solemnities, there were stipulations added, which were done by Question and Answer: Doe you promise? I promise. Hence it is called and we call it Stipulation, from the Latine word, which comes from the Greek word, , or , which is as much as , or , because these words did make the Covenant valid. As for Isidorus