If God cannot pardon sin without satisfaction,1 then it is necessary that he punish sin by absolute necessity, or sin presupposed, it is of absolute necessity that it be punished; but it is not of absolute necessity that sin be punished, for then God should punish it always in one manner, and as much as he can, as natural agents work: whereas we see by experience, that God doth differently punish the sins of men in this life, the lesser offenders most, the greater least many times, ever so as their punishments might be increased. Neither can it be said, that the greatness of punishment in this life, doth lessen their punishment in the life to come; for the punishments of the life to come being eternal, can carry no proportion with the punishments of this life. Then it was of absolute necessity that Christ should suffer so many stripes and no more, be forsaken just so long and no longer, continue in his agony so many hours and neither more nor less.2 The bounty of God to reward obedience is essential as well as justice to punish iniquity: and if God punish iniquity by absolute and natural necessity, of necessity he must reward obedience: if he punish iniquity without divine constitution, he must reward obedience in the same manner. God may inflict a more mild punishment then sin deserveth, therefore at least he may leave some degree of sin unpunished: as also, it is lawful for God to men equal in sin, to grant pardon to one, to punish another according to his deserts. To give reward above merit is not contrary to justice, if ⟨p. 275⟩it be given of our own: nor to punish mercifully, and less then the fault deserveth, if it be a fault committed against our selves. And it seems as much repugnant to justice3 to accept a surety, as to pardon the punishment; especially that the Son of God, the party offended, should take upon him our nature, and make satisfaction for us. And if God by absolute necessity must punish sin as it deserveth, then it is simply impossible to renew the sinner by repentance, or to annihilate him, because then he doth not bear what punishment his sin doth call for from the hand of justice. Justice is essential to God, so is mercy, bounty, liberality: but God showeth mercy to whom he will & doth good to whom he will freely, not by absolute necessity:
If God cannot pardon sin without satisfaction,1 then it is necessary that he punish sin by absolute necessity, or sin presupposed, it is of absolute necessity that it be punished; but it is not of absolute necessity that sin be punished, for then God should punish it alwaies in one manner, and as much as he can, as naturall agents worke: whereas we see by experience, that God doth differently punish the sins of men in this life, the lesser offendors most, the greater least many times, ever so as their punishments might be increased. Neither can it be said, that the greatnesse of punishment in this life, doth lessen their punishment in the life to come; for the punishments of the life to come being eternall, can carry no proportion with the punishments of this life. Then it was of absolute necessity that Christ should suffer so many stripes and no more, be forsaken just so long and no longer, continue in his agony so many houres and neither more nor lesse.2 The bounty of God to reward obedience is essentiall as well as justice to punish iniquity: and if God punish iniquity by absolute and naturall necessity, of necessity he must reward obedience: if he punish iniquity without divine constitution, he must reward obedience in the same manner. God may inflict a more mild punishment then sin deserveth, therefore at least he may leave some degree of sin unpunished: as also, it is lawfull for God to men equall in sin, to grant pardon to one, to punish another according to his deserts. To give reward above merit is not contrary to justice, if ⟨p. 275⟩it be given of our owne: nor to punish mercifully, and lesse then the fault deserveth, if it be a fault committed against our selves. And it seemes as much repugnant to justice3 to accept a surety, as to pardon the punishment; especially that the Son of God, the party offended, should take upon him our nature, and make satisfaction for us. And if God by absolute necessity must punish sin as it deserveth, then it is simply impossible to renew the sinner by repentance, or to annihilate him, because then he doth not bear what punishmēt his sin doth call for from the hand of justice. Justice is essentiall to God, so is mercy, bounty, liberality: but God sheweth mercy to whom he will & doth good to whom he will freely, not by absolute necessity:
- 1Hae rationes tum demum locum obtinerent, si ita De• putaretur agere ex necessitate naturae, ut solo naturae impetu, citra omnem intellectum, & voluntatis actum, ageret, veluti ignis calefacit ex necessitate naturae. Windel. de mundo Sect. 2. c. 2. Lex agendi necessitas 1. naturae 2. congruentiae. Illa per quam agens ita agit, ut per naturam non possit non agere, estque vel sine cognitione, vel cum cognitione. Ista per quam agens non potest non congruenter suae naturae agere.
- 2Sciendum est, non sequi injustum ex quavis negatione justi, etiam posi•is •isdem circumstantij•. Non est perpetuum ut id quod justè fiat, non nisi injustè omittatur.
- 3Sunt quaedam Dei proprietates quarum exercitium, tum quoad actum, tum quoad tempu• & modum actus, imo etiam quoad objecti determinationem, pendet a libera ipsus voluntate. Ex promissione jus aliquod acquiritur ei cui facta est promissio: at comminatione apertius dun•axat declaratur meritum poenae in peccante, & jus puniendi in comminante. Cum bonitas & misericordia Dei non minus proprietas ej•• sit, quam justitia: ac quamquam ex misericordia non •gisset, sed puniisset universos, minimè eo mutabilis, vel etiam immisericors potuerit dici: similiter, neque extra decreti considerationem, mutabilem vel injustum dici potuisse, quanquam ignovisset universis citra illam satisfactionem. Quod is qui deliquit paenam meretur, eoque punibilis est, hoc ex ipsa peccati & peccatoris ad superiorem relatione necessariò sequitur & propriè naturale, ut vero puniatur quivis peccator poena tali quae culpae respondeat, non est necessarium simpliciter & universaliter, neque propriè naturale: sed naturae satis conveniens. Chamier. panstrat. Tom. 2. l. 5. c. 1•. Parker de desc. l. 3. Sect. 56. Wotton de Reconcil l. 1 c 4. V•ss. respons. ad Jud. Ravensperg. cap. 28. Isa. 53. 10. Psal. 40. 8. Joh. 5. 19, 30.Sunt quaedam Dei proprietates quarum exercitium, tum quoad actum, tum quoad tempu & modum actus, imo etiam quoad objecti determinationem, pendet a libera ipsus voluntate. Ex promissione jus aliquod acquiritur ei cui facta est promissio: at comminatione apertius dunaxat declaratur meritum poenae in peccante, & jus puniendi in comminante. Cum bonitas & misericordia Dei non minus proprietas ej sit, quam justitia: ac quamquam ex misericordia non gisset, sed puniisset universos, minimè eo mutabilis, vel etiam immisericors potuerit dici: similiter, neque extra decreti considerationem, mutabilem vel injustum dici potuisse, quanquam ignovisset universis citra illam satisfactionem. Quod is qui deliquit paenam meretur, eoque punibilis est, hoc ex ipsa peccati & peccatoris ad superiorem relatione necessariò sequitur & propriè naturale, ut vero puniatur quivis peccator poena tali quae culpae respondeat, non est necessarium simpliciter & universaliter, neque propriè naturale: sed naturae satis conveniens. Chamier. panstrat. Tom. 2. l. 5. c. 1. Parker de desc. l. 3. Sect. 56. Wotton de Reconcil l. 1 c 4. Vss. respons. ad Iud. Ravensperg. cap. 28.
