And it is Divine joy: It may be said to be Divine in three respects: First, it comes from God: Secondly, 1it is in God: Thirdly, it is with God. First, it comes from God, being caused by the Spirit of God, 2and that is another manner of joy then the men of the world have. Secondly, it is in God, rejoicing in 3God, and that is other manner of joy then rejoicing in meat and drink: Look what difference there is between the excellency that is in God, and the excellency that there is in meat, and drink, and idle sports, so much difference is between the joy that Gods people have in God, and the joy that wicked men have in the creature: And it is divine, in regard that it is joy with God, it is the same joy that God himself hath; 4carnal hearts rejoice one with another in sensual things, but God does not rejoice in those things you rejoice in, but the Saints in heaven shall be exercised in the same joy that God himself hath, and rejoice in the same things that God shall rejoice in; to have the beams of our joy mingle with the beams of Gods joy, and so to have Gods joy and ours put into one, that must needs be admirable joy. Notwithstanding this ⟨p. 600⟩joy of the Saints shall be thus glorious, yet the utmost happiness of man consists not in it; though joy be a necessary concomitant to mans blessedness, yet mans blessedness consists not in it. We do not seek 5the enjoyment of God, that we might delight in this enjoyment, but we seek delight in the enjoyment, because the enjoyment is the greatest good.
And it is Divine joy: It may be said to be Divine in three respects: First, it comes from God: Secondly, 1it is in God: Thirdly, it is with God. First, it comes from God, being caused by the Spirit of God, 2and that is another maner of joy then the men of the world have. Secondly, it is in God, rejoycing in 3God, and that is other maner of joy then rejoycing in meat and drink: Look what difference there is between the excellency that is in God, and the excellency that there is in meat, and drink, and idle sports, so much difference is between the joy that Gods people have in God, and the joy that wicked men have in the creature: And it is divine, in regard that it is joy with God, it is the same joy that God himself hath; 4carnal hearts rejoyce one with another in sensual things, but God does not rejoyce in those things you rejoyce in, but the Saints in heaven shall be exercised in the same joy that God himself hath, and rejoyce in the same things that God shall rejoyce in; to have the beams of our joy mingle with the beams of Gods joy, and so to have Gods joy and ours put into one, that must needs be admirable joy. Notwithstanding this ⟨p. 600⟩joy of the Saints shall be thus glorious, yet the utmost happiness of man consists not in it; though joy be a necessary concomitant to mans blessedness, yet mans blessedness consists not in it. We do not seek 5the enjoyment of God, that we might delight in this enjoyment, but we seek delight in the enjoyment, because the enjoyment is the greatest good.
- 14.
- 21.
- 32.
- 43.
- 5Si delectatio sit ultimus finis, tum actus aliquis elicitus voluntat is potest esse ultimus finis, sed non—Nam objectū voluntatis est finis, sicut objectum visus est color, it a ut impossibile est, quòd primum visibile fit ipsum videre, quia omne videre est alicujus objecta visibilis, ita impossibile est quòd primum appetibile quo• est finis sit ipsum vell• Tho. 1. 2. q. 1. Art. 1. ad secund. Apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem bovi, sed ad aliquod bonum, particulare quod est delectabile, & ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum operationes sunt propter delectationem, sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni ad cujus consequutionem sequitur delectatio, unde principaliùs intendit bonum quàm delectationem. Thom. 1. 2. q. 4. Art. ad. 2. second.Si delectatio sit ultimus finis, tum actus aliquis elicitus voluntat is potest esse ultimus finis, sed non—Nam objectū voluntatis est finis, sicut objectum visus est color, it a ut impossibile est, quòd primum visibile fit ipsum videre, quia omne videre est alicujus objecta visibilis, ita impossibile est quòd primum appetibile quo• est finis sit ipsum vell• Tho. 1. 2. q. 1. Art. 1. ad secund. Apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem boui, sed ad aliquod bonum, particulare quod est delectabile, & ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum operationes sunt propter delectationem, sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni ad cujus consequutionem sequitur delectatio, unde principaliùs intendit bonum quàm delectationem. Thom. 1. 2. q. 4. Art. ad. 2. second.
