A32723:1405
Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God
Several discourses upon the existence and attributes of God by that late eminent minister in Christ, Mr. Stephen Charnocke ...
London: printed for D. Newman, 1682
A DISCOURSE UPON Gods Knowledge.A DISCOURSE UPON Gods Knowledg.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3. 'Tis further evident that God knows all possible things, because he knew those things which he has created, before they were created, when they were yet in a possibility. If God knew things before they were created, he knew them when they were in a possibility, and not in actual reality. 'Tis absurd to imagine that his Understanding did lackey after the creatures, and draw knowledge from them after they were created. 'Tis absurd to think that God did create, before he knew what he could or would create. If he knew those things he did create when they were possible, he must know all things which he can create, and therefore all things that are possible.
3. 'Tis further evident that God knows all possible things, because he knew those things which he has created, before they were created, when they were yet in a possibility. If God knew things before they were created, he knew them when they were in a possibility, and not in actual reality. 'Tis absurd to imagine that his Understanding did lacquy after the creatures, and draw knowledg from them after they were created. 'Tis absurd to think that God did create, before he knew what he could or would create. If he knew those things he did create when they were possible, he must know all things which he can create, and therefore all things that are possible.
To conclude this, We must consider that this Knowledge is of another kind than his knowledge of things that are or shall be. He sees possible things as possible, not as things that ever are or shall be. If he saw them as existing or future, and they shall never be, this knowledge would be false, there would be a deceit in it, which cannot be. He knows those things not in themselves, because they are not, nor in their causes because they shall never be: he knows them in his own Power, not in his Will: He understands them as able to produce them, not as willing to effect them. Things possible he knows only in his Power, things future he knows both in his Power and his Will, as he is both able and determined in his own good pleasure to give being to them. Those that shall never come to pass, he knows only in himself, as a sufficient cause; those things that shall come into being, he knows in himself as the efficient cause, and also in their immediate second causes.