A32723:1494
Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God
Several discourses upon the existence and attributes of God by that late eminent minister in Christ, Mr. Stephen Charnocke ...
London: printed for D. Newman, 1682
A DISCOURSE UPON Gods Knowledge.A DISCOURSE UPON Gods Knowledg.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
6. But what if the foreknowledge of God, and the liberty of the Will, cannot be fully reconciled by man? shall we therefore deny a Perfection in God to support a liberty in our selves? Shall we rather fasten ignorance upon God, and accuse him of blindness, to maintain our liberty? That God doth foreknow every thing, and yet that there is liberty in the rational Creature, are both certain; but how fully to reconcile them, may surmount the Understanding of man. Some Truths the Disciples were not capable of bearing in the days of Christ; and several Truths our understandings cannot reach as long as the World doth last; yet in the mean time we must on the one hand take heed of conceiving God ignorant, and on the other hand of imagining the Creature necessitated; the one will render God imperfect, and the other will seem to render him unjust, in punishing man for that Sin which he could not avoid, but was brought into by a fatal necessity. God is sufficient to render a reason of his own Proceedings, and clear up all at the day of Judgment; 'tis a part of mans curiosity, since the Fall, to be prying into Gods Secrets, things too high for him; whereby he singes his own Wings, and confounds his own Understanding. 'Tis a cursed affectation that runs in the Blood of Adams Posterity, to know as God, tho' our first Father smarted and ruined his Posterity in that attempt; the ways and knowledge of God are as much above our thoughts and conceptions, as the heavens are above the earth, Isa. 55.9.1 and so sublime, that we cannot comprehend them in their true and just greatness; his designs are so mysterious, and the ways of his conduct so profound, that it is not possible to dive into them: The force of our understandings is below his infinite Wisdom, and therefore we should adore him with an humble astonishment, and cry out with the Apostle, Rom. 11.33. Oh the depth of the Riches of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his Judgments! and his ways past finding out! When ever we meet with depths that we cannot fathom, let us remember that he is God, and we his Creatures; and not be guilty of so great extravagance, as to think that a Subject can pierce into all the secrets of a Prince, or a Work understand all the operations of the Artificer.
6. But what if the foreknowledg of God, and the liberty of the Will, cannot be fully reconciled by man? shall we therefore deny a Perfection in God to support a liberty in our selves? Shall we rather fasten ignorance upon God, and accuse him of blindness, to maintain our liberty? That God doth foreknow every thing, and yet that there is liberty in the rational Creature, are both certain; but how fully to reconcile them, may surmount the Understanding of man. Some Truths the Disciples were not capable of bearing in the days of Christ; and several Truths our understandings cannot reach as long as the World doth last; yet in the mean time we must on the one hand take heed of conceiving God ignorant, and on the other hand of imagining the Creature necessitated; the one will render God imperfect, and the other will seem to render him unjust, in punishing man for that Sin which he could not avoid, but was brought into by a fatal necessity. God is sufficient to render a reason of his ovvn Proceedings, and clear up all at the day of Judgment; 'tis a part of mans curiosity, since the Fall, to be prying into Gods Secrets, things too high for him; vvhereby he singes his ovvn Wings, and confounds his ovvn Understanding. 'Tis a cursed affectation that runs in the Blood of Adams Posterity, to know as God, tho' our first Father smarted and ruin'd his Posterity in that attempt; the vvays and knovvledg of God are as much above our thoughts and conceptions, as the heavens are above the earth, Isa. 55.9.1 and so sublime, that vve cannot comprehend them in their true and just greatness; his designs are so mysterious, and the vvays of his conduct so profound, that it is not possible to dive into them: The force of our understandings is belovv his infinite Wisdom, and therefore vve should adore him vvith an humble astonishment, and cry out vvith the Apostle, Rom. 11.33. Oh the depth of the Riches of the Wisdom and Knowledg of God! how unsearchable are his Judgments! and his ways past finding out! When ever vve meet vvith depths that vve cannot fathom, let us remember that he is God, and vve his Creatures; and not be guilty of so great extravagance, as to think that a Subject can pierce into all the secrets of a Prince, or a Work understand all the operations of the Artificer.
- 1Daillá Melang. part 2. p. 712. 725.
Let us only resolve not to fasten any thing on God that is unworthy of the Perfection of his nature, and dishonourable to the Glory of his Majesty; nor imagine that we can ever step out of the rank of Creatures to the glory of the Deity, to understand fully every thing in his nature.
Let us only resolve not to fasten any thing on God that is unvvorthy of the Perfection of his nature, and dishonourable to the Glory of his Majesty; nor imagine that vve can ever step out of the rank of Creatures to the glory of the Deity, to understand fully every thing in his nature.
So much for the second general, What God knows.
So much for the second general, What God knovvs.
III. The third is, How God knows all things? As it is necessary we should conceive ⟨p. 305⟩God to be an Understanding Being, else he could not be God; so we must conceive his understanding to be infinitely more pure and perfect than ours in the act of it, else we liken him to our selves, and debase him as low as his Foot-stool.1 As among Creatures there are degrees of Being and Perfection; Plants above Earth and Sand, because they have a Power of growth; Beasts above Plants, because to their Power of growth, there is an addition of excellency of sense; rational Creatures above Beasts, because to Sense there is added the Dignity of Reason: The Understanding of man is more noble than all the vegetative power of Plants, or the sensitive Power of Beasts: God therefore must be infinitely more excellent in his Understanding, and therefore in the manner of it. As man differs from a Beast in regard of his knowledge; so doth God also from man, in regard of his Knowledge. As God therefore is in Being and Perfection, infinitely more above a man than a man is above a Beast, the manner of his Knowledge must be infinitely more above a mans knowledge, than the knowledge of a man is above that of a Beast; our understandings can clasp an object in a moment, that is at a great distance from our sense; our eye by one elevated motion can view the Heavens; the manner of Gods Understanding must be unconceivably above our glimmerings; as the manner of his Being is infinitely more perfect than all Beings, so must the manner of his Understanding be infinitely more perfect than all Created understandings.2 Indeed the manner of Gods Knowledge can no more be known by us, than his Essence can be known by us; and the same incapacity in man, which renders him unable to comprehend the Being of God, renders him as unable to comprehend the manner of Gods Understanding: As there is a vast distance between the Essence of God, and our Beings, so there is between the Thoughts of God and our Thoughts; the Heavens are not so much higher than the Earth, as the Thoughts of God are above the thoughts of men, yea, and of the highest Angel, Isa. 55.8, 9. yet tho' we know not the manner of Gods Knowledge, we know that he knows; as tho' we know not the infiniteness of God, yet we know that he is infinite. 'Tis Gods sole Prerogative to know himself, what he is;
III. The third is, How God knows all things? As it is necessary vve should conceive ⟨p. 305⟩God to be an Understanding Being, else he could not be God; so vve must conceive his understanding to be infinitely more pure and perfect than ours in the act of it, else vve liken him to our selves, and debase him as lovv as his Foot-stool.1 As among Creatures there are degrees of Being and Perfection; Plants above Earth and Sand, because they have a Povver of grovvth; Beasts above Plants, because to their Povver of grovvth, there is an addition of excellency of sense; rational Creatures above Beasts, because to Sense there is added the Dignity of Reason: The Understanding of man is more noble than all the vegetative povver of Plants, or the sensitive Power of Beasts: God therefore must be infinitely more excellent in his Understanding, and therefore in the manner of it. As man differs from a Beast in regard of his knovvledg; so doth God also from man, in regard of his Knovvledg. As God therefore is in Being and Perfection, infinitely more above a man than a man is above a Beast, the manner of his Knovvledg must be infinitely more above a mans knovvledg, than the knovvledg of a man is above that of a Beast; our understandings can clasp an object in a moment, that is at a great distance from our sense; our eye by one elevated motion can vievv the Heavens; the manner of Gods Understanding must be unconceivably above our glimmerings; as the manner of his Being is infinitely more perfect than all Beings, so must the manner of his Understanding be infinitely more perfect than all Created understandings.2 Indeed the manner of Gods Knovvledg can no more be knovvn by us, than his Essence can be knovvn by us; and the same incapacity in man, vvhich renders him unable to comprehend the Being of God, renders him as unable to comprehend the manner of Gods Understanding: As there is a vast distance betvveen the Essence of God, and our Beings, so there is betvveen the Thoughts of God and our Thoughts; the Heavens are not so much higher than the Earth, as the Thoughts of God are above the thoughts of men, yea, and of the highest Angel, Isa. 55.8, 9. yet tho' vve knovv not the manner of Gods Knovvledg, vve knovv that he knovvs; as tho' vve knovv not the infiniteness of God, yet vve knovv that he is infinite. 'Tis Gods sole Prerogative to knovv himself, vvhat he is;
- 1Maxim. Tyriu• Dissert. 1. p. 9. 10.
- 2Maimonia• More Nevochim. part 3. c. 20. p. 391 392, 393.
and it is equally his Prerogative to know how he knows; the manner of Gods knowledge therefore must be considered by us, as free from those Imperfections our knowledge is encumbered with.
and it is equally his Prerogative to knovv hovv he knovvs; the manner of Gods knovvledg therefore must be considered by us, as free from those Imperfections our knovvledg is encumbred vvith.
In general, God doth necessarily know all things; he is necessarily Omnipresent, because of the immensity of his Essence; so he is necessarily Omniscient, because of the infiniteness of his Understanding. 'Tis no more at the liberty of his Will, whether he will know all things, than whether he will be able to create all things; 'tis no more at the liberty of his Will, whether he will be Omniscient, than whether he will be Holy; he can as little be ignorant, as he can be impure; he knows not all things, because he will know them, but because it is Essential to his nature to know them.
In general, God doth necessarily knovv all things; he is necessarily Omnipresent, because of the immensity of his Essence; so he is necessarily Omniscient, because of the infiniteness of his Understanding. 'Tis no more at the liberty of his Will, whether he will know all things, than whether he will be able to create all things; 'tis no more at the liberty of his Will, whether he will be Omniscient, than whether he will be Holy; he can as little be ignorant, as he can be impure; he knows not all things, because he will know them, but because it is Essential to his nature to know them.
In particular,
Proposition 1. God knows by his own Essence; that is, He sees the nature of things in the Ideas of his own mind, and the events of things in the Decrees of his own Will; he knows them not by viewing the things, but by viewing himself; his own Essence is the Mirror and Book, wherein he beholds all things that he doth ordain, dispose and execute; and so he knows all things in their first and original cause; which is no other than his own Essence Willing, and his own Essence executing what he Wills; he knows them in his Power, as the Physical Principle; in his Will, as the moral Principle of things, as some speak.
Proposition 1. God knows by his own Essence; that is, He sees the nature of things in the Ideas of his own mind, and the events of things in the Decrees of his own Will; he knows them not by viewing the things, but by viewing himself; his own Essence is the Mirrour and Book, wherein he beholds all things that he doth ordain, dispose and execute; and so he knows all things in their first and original cause; which is no other than his own Essence Willing, and his own Essence executing what he Wills; he knows them in his Power, as the Physical Principle; in his Will, as the moral Principle of things, as some speak.
He borrows not the knowledge of Creatures from the Creatures, nor depends upon them for means of Understanding, as we poor Worms do, who are beholden to the objects abroad to assist us with Images of things, and to our senses to convey them into our minds; God would then acquire a Perfection from those things which are below himself, and an excellency from those things that are vile; his Knowledge would not precede the Being of the Creatures, but the Creatures would be before the act of his Knowledge. If he understood by Images drawn from the Creatures, as we do, there would be something in God which is not God, viz. the Images of things drawn from outward objects: God would then depend upon Creatures for that which is more noble than a bare Being; for to be Understanding, is ⟨p. 306⟩more excellent than barely to be. Besides, if Gods Knowledge of his Creatures were derived from the Creatures by the impression of any thing upon him, as there is upon us, he could not know from Eternity, because from Eternity there was no actual existence of any thing but himself; and therefore there could not be any Images shot out from any thing, because there was not any thing in Being but God; as there is no Principle of Being to any thing but by his Essence; so there is no Principle of the Knowledge of any thing by himself but his Essence: If the knowledge of God were distinct from his Essence, his Knowledge were not Eternal, because there is nothing Eternal but his Essence.
He borrows not the knowledg of Creatures from the Creatures, nor depends upon them for means of Understanding, as we poor Worms do, who are beholden to the objects abroad to assist us with Images of things, and to our senses to convey them into our minds; God would then acquire a Perfection from those things which are below himself, and an excellency from those things that are vile; his Knowledg would not precede the Being of the Creatures, but the Creatures would be before the act of his Knowledg. If he understood by Images drawn from the Creatures, as we do, there would be something in God which is not God, viz. the Images of things drawn from outward objects: God would then depend upon Creatures for that which is more noble than a bare Being; for to be Understanding, is ⟨p. 306⟩more excellent than barely to be. Besides, if Gods Knowledg of his Creatures were derived from the Creatures by the impression of any thing upon him, as there is upon us, he could not know from Eternity, because from Eternity there was no actual existence of any thing but himself; and therefore there could not be any Images shot out from any thing, because there was not any thing in Being but God; as there is no Principle of Being to any thing but by his Essence; so there is no Principle of the Knowledg of any thing by himself but his Essence: If the knowledg of God were distinct from his Essence, his Knowledg were not Eternal, because there is nothing Eternal but his Essence.
His Understanding is not a faculty in him as it is in us, but the same with his Essence, because of the simplicity of his nature; God is not made up of various parts, one distinct from another as we are, and therefore doth not understand by a part of himself, but by himself; so that to be, and to understand, is the same with God; his Essence is not one thing, and the power whereby he understands, another; he would then be compounded, and not be the most simple Being: This also is necessary for the Perfection of God; for the more perfect and noble the way and manner of knowing is, the more perfect and noble is the knowledge. The perfection of Knowledge depends upon the excellency of the medium whereby we know. As a knowledge by Reason, is a more noble way of knowing than knowledge by sense; so 'tis more excellent for God to know by his Essence, than by any thing without him, any thing mixed with him; the first would render him dependant, and the other would demolish his simplicity.
His Understanding is not a faculty in him as it is in us, but the same with his Essence, because of the simplicity of his nature; God is not made up of various parts, one distinct from another as we are, and therefore doth not understand by a part of himself, but by himself; so that to be, and to understand, is the same with God; his Essence is not one thing, and the power whereby he understands, another; he would then be compounded, and not be the most simple Being: This also is necessary for the Perfection of God; for the more perfect and noble the way and manner of knowing is, the more perfect and noble is the knowledg. The perfection of Knowledg depends upon the excellency of the medium whereby we know. As a knowledg by Reason, is a more noble way of knowing than knowledg by sense; so 'tis more excellent for God to know by his Essence, than by any thing without him, any thing mixt with him; the first would render him dependant, and the other would demolish his simplicity.
Again, the natures of all things are contained in God; not formally; for then the nature of the Creatures would be God: but eminently; he that planted the ear, shall he not hear? he that formed the eye, shall he not see? Psal. 94.9. He hath in himself eminently the Beauty, Perfection, Life and Vigour of all Creatures; he Created nothing contrary to himself, but every thing with some foot-steps of himself in them; he could not have pronounced them good, as he did, had there been any thing in them contrary to his own goodness; and therefore as his Essence primarily represents it self, so it represents the Creatures, and makes them known to him. As the Essence of God is eminently all things, so by understanding his Essence, he eminently understands all things.* And therefore he hath not one knowledge of himself, and another knowledge of the Creatures; but by knowing himself, as the original and exemplary cause of all things, he cannot be ignorant of any Creature which he is the cause of; so that he knows all things, not by an understanding of them, but by an understanding of himself; by understanding his own Power as the efficient of them, his own Will as the orderer of them, his own Goodness as the adorner and beautifier of them, his own Wisdom as the disposer of them, and his own Holiness, to which many of their actions are contrary.
Again, the natures of all things are contained in God; not formally; for then the nature of the Creatures would be God: but eminently; he that planted the ear, shall he not hear? he that formed the eye, shall he not see? Psal. 94.9. He hath in himself eminently the Beauty, Perfection, Life and Vigor of all Creatures; he Created nothing contrary to himself, but every thing with some foot-steps of himself in them; he could not have pronounced them good, as he did, had there been any thing in them contrary to his own goodness; and therefore as his Essence primarily represents it self, so it represents the Creatures, and makes them known to him. As the Essence of God is eminently all things, so by understanding his Essence, he eminently understands all things.* And therefore he hath not one knowledg of himself, and another knowledg of the Creatures; but by knowing himself, as the original and exemplary cause of all things, he cannot be ignorant of any Creature which he is the cause of; so that he knows all things, not by an understanding of them, but by an understanding of himself; by understanding his own Power as the efficient of them, his own Will as the orderer of them, his own Goodness as the adorner and beautifier of them, his own Wisdom as the disposer of them, and his own Holiness, to which many of their actions are contrary.
- *Diony•,
*As he sees all things possible in his own Power, because he is able to produce them; so he sees all things future in his own Will, decreeing to effect them, if they be good, or Decreeing to permit them, if they be Evil. In this Glass he sees what he will give Being to, and what he will suffer to fall into a deficiency, without looking out of himself, or borrowing Knowledge from his Creatures; he knows all things in himself. And thus his Knowledge is more noble, and of a higher elevation than ours, or the knowledge of any Creature can be; he knows all things by one comprehension of the causes in himself.
*As he sees all things possible in his own Power, because he is able to produce them; so he sees all things future in his own Will, decreeing to effect them, if they be good, or Decreeing to permit them, if they be Evil. In this Glass he sees what he will give Being to, and what he will suffer to fall into a deficiency, without looking out of himself, or borrowing Knowledg from his Creatures; he knows all things in himself. And thus his Knowledg is more noble, and of a higher elevation than ours, or the knowledg of any Creature can be; he knows all things by one comprehension of the causes in himself.
- *Kendall against Goodwin of Foreknowledge.Kendall against Goodwin of Foreknowledg.
Proposition 2. God knows all things by one act of intuition. This the Schools call an intuitive knowledge. This follows upon the other; for if he know by his own Essence, he knows all things by one act, there would be otherwise a division in his Essence, a first and a last, a nearness and a distance. As what he made, he made by one word; so what he sees, he pierceth into by one glance from Eternity to Eternity: As he Wills all things by one act of his Will, so he knows all things by one act of his Understanding: he knows not some things discursively from other things, nor knows one thing successively after another. As by one act he imparts Essence to things; so by one act he knows the nature of things.
Proposition 2. God knows all things by one act of intuition. This the Schools call an intuitive knowledg. This follows upon the other; for if he know by his own Essence, he knows all things by one act, there would be otherwise a division in his Essence, a first and a last, a nearness and a distance. As what he made, he made by one word; so what he sees, he pierceth into by one glance from Eternity to Eternity: As he Wills all things by one act of his Will, so he knows all things by one act of his Understanding: he knows not some things discursively from other things, nor knows one thing successively after another. As by one act he imparts Essence to things; so by one act he knows the nature of things.
1. He doth not know by Discourse, as we do. That is, By deducing one thing from another, and from common notions drawing out other rational conclusions and arguing ⟨p. 307⟩one thing from another, and springing up various consequences from some Principle assented to; but God stands in no need of reasonings; the making inferences and abstracting things, would be stains in the infinite Perfection of God; here would be a mixture of knowledge and ignorance; while he knew the Principle, he would not know the consequence and conclusion, till he had actually deduced it; one thing would be known after another, and so he would have an ignorance, and then a knowledge; and there would be different conceptions in God, and knowledge would be multiplied according to the multitude of objects; as it is in humane Understandings. But God knows all things before they did exist, and never was ignorant of them, Acts 15.18. known unto God are all his Works from the beginning of the World. He therefore knows them all at once; the knowledge of one thing was not before another, nor depended upon another, as it doth in the way of Humane reasoning.1 Tho' indeed some make a virtual Discourse in God; that is, tho' God hath a simple knowledge, yet it doth virtually contain a Discourse by the flowing of one knowledge from another; as from the knowledge of his own Power, he knows what things are possible to be made by him; and from the knowledge of himself, he passes to the knowledge of the Creatures; but this is only according to our Conception, and because of our weakness they are apprehended as two distinct acts in God, one of which is the reason of another: As we say that one Attribute is the reason of another; as his Mercy, may be said to be the reason of his Patience; and his Omnipresence, to be the reason of the knowledge of present things done in the World. God indeed by one simple act, knows himself and the Creatures; but when that Act whereby he knows himself, is conceived by us to pass to the knowledge of the Creatures, we must not understand it to be a new Act, distinct from the other; but the same act upon different terms or objects; such an order is in our understandings and conceptions, not in God's.
1. He doth not know by Discourse, as we do. That is, By deducing one thing from another, and from common notions drawing out other rational conclusions and arguing ⟨p. 307⟩one thing from another, and springing up various consequences from some Principle assented to; but God stands in no need of reasonings; the making inferences and abstracting things, would be stains in the infinite Perfection of God; here would be a mixture of knowledg and ignorance; while he knew the Principle, he would not know the consequence and conclusion, till he had actually deduc'd it; one thing would be known after another, and so he would have an ignorance, and then a knowledg; and there would be different conceptions in God, and knowledg would be multiplyed according to the multitude of objects; as it is in humane Understandings. But God knows all things before they did exist, and never was ignorant of them, Acts 15.18. known unto God are all his Works from the beginning of the World. He therefore knows them all at once; the knowledg of one thing was not before another, nor depended upon another, as it doth in the way of Humane reasoning.1 Tho' indeed some make a vertual Discourse in God; that is, tho' God hath a simple knowledg, yet it doth vertually contain a Discourse by the flowing of one knowledg from another; as from the knowledg of his own Power, he knows what things are possible to be made by him; and from the knowledg of himself, he passes to the knowledg of the Creatures; but this is only according to our Conception, and because of our weakness they are apprehended as two distinct acts in God, one of which is the reason of another: As we say that one Attribute is the reason of another; as his Mercy, may be said to be the reason of his Patience; and his Omnipresence, to be the reason of the knowledg of present things done in the World. God indeed by one simple act, knows himself and the Creatures; but when that Act whereby he knows himself, is conceived by us to pass to the knowledg of the Creatures, we must not understand it to be a new Act, distinct from the other; but the same act upon different terms or objects; such an order is in our understandings and conceptions, not in God's.
- 1Suarez. vol. 1. de Deo, lib 3. cap. 2. p. 133, 134.
2. Nor doth he know successively, as we do. That is, not by Drops, one thing after another. This follows from the former; a knowledge of all things without Discourse, is a Knowledge without Succession.1 The knowledge of one thing is not in God before another, one act of knowledge doth not beget another; in regard of the objects, one thing is before another, one year before another, one Generation of men before another, one is the cause, the other is the effect: In the Creatures there is such a Succession, and God knows there will be such a Succession; but there is no such order in Gods knowledge; for he knows all those Successions by one glance, without any succession of knowledge in himself.
2. Nor doth he know successively, as we do. That is, not by Drops, one thing after another. This follows from the former; a knowledg of all things without Discourse, is a Knowledg without Succession.1 The knowledg of one thing is not in God before another, one act of knowledg doth not beget another; in regard of the objects, one thing is before another, one year before another, one Generation of men before another, one is the cause, the other is the effect: In the Creatures there is such a Succession, and God knows there will be such a Succession; but there is no such order in Gods knowledg; for he knows all those Successions by one glance, without any succession of knowledg in himself.
- 1Gamach in Aquin. q. 14. cap. 1. p. 119.
Man in his view of things, must turn sometimes his Body, sometimes only his Eyes, he cannot see all the Contents of a Letter at once, and tho' he beholds all the lines in the page of a Book at once, and a whole Country in a Map, yet to know what is contained in them, he must turn his eye from word to word, and line to line, and so spin out one thing after another by several acts and motions. We behold a great part of the Sea at once*, but not all the dimensions of it; for to know the length of the Sea, we move our eyes one way; to see the breadth of it, we turn our eyes another way; to behold the depth of it, we have another motion of them. And when we cast our eyes up to Heaven, we seem to receive in at an instant the whole tent of the Hemisphere; yet there is but one object the eye can attentively pitch upon, and we cannot distinctly view what we see in a lump, without various motions of our eyes, which is not done without succession of Time2. And certainly the Understanding of Angels is bounded, according to the measure of their Beings; so that it cannot extend it self at one time, to a quantity of objects, to make a distinct application of them, but the objects must present themselves one by one: But God is all Eye, all Understanding; as there is no succession in his Essence, so there is none in his Knowledge; his understanding in the nature, and in the act, is infinite, as it is in the Text. He therefore sees Eternally and Universally, all things, by one act, without any motion, much less various motions; the various changes of things, in their substance, qualities, places and relations, withdraw not any thing from his Eye, nor bring any new thing to his Knowledge; he doth not upon consideration of present things turn his mind from past; or when he beholds future things, turn his mind from present; but he sees them not one after another, but all at once and all together; the whole Circle of his own Counsels, and all the various Lines drawn ⟨p. 308⟩forth from the Centre of his Will, to the circumference of his Creatures; Just as if a man were able in one moment to read a whole Library;
Man in his view of things, must turn sometimes his Body, sometimes only his Eyes, he cannot see all the Contents of a Letter at once, and tho' he beholds all the lines in the page of a Book at once, and a whole Country in a Map, yet to know what is contain'd in them, he must turn his eye from word to word, and line to line, and so spin out one thing after another by several acts and motions. We behold a great part of the Sea at once*, but not all the dimensions of it; for to know the length of the Sea, we move our eyes one way; to see the breadth of it, we turn our eyes another way; to behold the depth of it, we have another motion of them. And when we cast our eyes up to Heaven, we seem to receive in at an instant the whole tent of the Hemisphere; yet there is but one object the eye can attentively pitch upon, and we cannot distinctly view what we see in a lump, without various motions of our eyes, which is not done without succession of Time2. And certainly the Understanding of Angels is bounded, according to the measure of their Beings; so that it cannot extend it self at one time, to a quantity of objects, to make a distinct application of them, but the objects must present themselves one by one: But God is all Eye, all Understanding; as there is no succession in his Essence, so there is none in his Knowledg; his understanding in the nature, and in the act, is infinite, as it is in the Text. He therefore sees Eternally and Universally, all things, by one act, without any motion, much less various motions; the various changes of things, in their substance, qualities, places and relations, withdraw not any thing from his Eye, nor bring any new thing to his Knowledg; he doth not upon consideration of present things turn his mind from past; or when he beholds future things, turn his mind from present; but he sees them not one after another, but all at once and all together; the whole Circle of his own Counsels, and all the various Lines drawn ⟨p. 308⟩forth from the Center of his Will, to the circumference of his Creatures; Just as if a man were able in one moment to read a whole Library;
- *saith Epiphanius.
- 2Amyrant morale chresti. Tom. 3. p. 137.