A32723:2485
Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God
Several discourses upon the existence and attributes of God by that late eminent minister in Christ, Mr. Stephen Charnocke ...
London: printed for D. Newman, 1682
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The Evil of an Action is not the effect of an Action, nor attends it as it is an Action, but as it is an Action so circumstantiated, and conversant about this or that Object; for the same Action done by two several Persons, may be good in one, and bad in the other. As when two Judges are in joint Commission for the Trial of a Malefactor, both upon the appearance of his Guilt condemn him. This Action in both, considered as an Action, is good; for it is an adjudging a Man to death, whose Crime deserves su•• • punishment. But this same Act, which is but one joint Act of both, may be Morally good in one Judge, and Morally evil in the other: Morally good in him that Condemns him out of an unbiased consideration of the Demerit of his Fact, Obedience to the Law, and Conscience of the Duty of his place; and Morally evil in the other, who hath no respect to those Considerations, but joins in the act of Condemnation, principally moved by some private Animosity against the Prisoner, and desire of revenge for some Injury he hath really received, or imagines that he hath received from him. The Act in it self is the same materially in both; but in one it is an Act of Justice, and in the other an Act of Murder, as it respects the Principles and Motives of it in the two Judges; take away the respect of private Revenge, and the Action in the Ill Judge had been as laudable as the Action of the other. The substance of an Act, and the sinfulness of an Act, are separable and distinguishable; and God may concur with the substance of an Act, without concurring with the sinfulness of the Act: As the good Judge, that Condemned the Prisoner out of Conscience, concurred with the evil Judge, who condemned the Prisoner out of private Revenge; not in the Principle and Motive of Condemnation, but in the Material part of Condemnation. So God assists in that Action of a Man wherein Sin is placed, but not in that which is the Formal reason of Sin, which is a privation of some Perfection the Action ought Morally to have.
The Evil of an Action is not the effect of an Action, nor attends it as it is an Action, but as it is an Action so circumstantiated, and conversant about this or that Object; for the same Action done by two several Persons, may be good in one, and bad in the other. As when two Judges are in joynt Commission for the Trial of a Malefactor, both upon the appearance of his Guilt condemn him. This Action in both, considered as an Action, is good; for it is an adjudging a Man to death, whose Crime deserves su punishment. But this same Act, which is but one joynt Act of both, may be Morally good in one Judge, and Morally evil in the other: Morally good in him that Condemns him out of an unbyassed consideration of the Demerit of his Fact, Obedience to the Law, and Conscience of the Duty of his place; and Morally evil in the other, who hath no respect to those Considerations, but joyns in the act of Condemnation, principally moved by some private Animosity against the Prisoner, and desire of revenge for some Injury he hath really received, or imagines that he hath received from him. The Act in it self is the same materially in both; but in one it is an Act of Justice, and in the other an Act of Murder, as it respects the Principles and Motives of it in the two Judges; take away the respect of private Revenge, and the Action in the Ill Judge had been as laudable as the Action of the other. The substance of an Act, and the sinfulness of an Act, are separable and distinguishable; and God may concur with the substance of an Act, without concurring with the sinfulness of the Act: As the good Judge, that Condemned the Prisoner out of Conscience, concurred with the evil Judge, who condemned the Prisoner out of private Revenge; not in the Principle and Motive of Condemnation, but in the Material part of Condemnation. So God assists in that Action of a Man wherein Sin is placed, but not in that which is the Formal reason of Sin, which is a privation of some Perfection the Action ought Morally to have.