Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God

6. The severe Punishment of Offenders, and the Afflictions he inflicts upon his Servants, are no violations of his Goodness. The Notion of Gods Vindictive Justice is as naturally inbred, and implanted in the mind of Man, as that of his Goodness, and those two Sentiments never shocked one another. The Heathen never thought him bad because he was just, nor unrighteous because he was good. God being Infinitely good, cannot possibly intend or act any thing but what is good: Thou art good, and thou dost good, i. e. whatsoever thou dost is good, whatsoever it be, pleasant or painful to the Creature:^* Punishments themselves are not a Moral Evil in the Person that inflicts, though they are a Natural Evil in the Person that suffers them.^† In ordering Punishment to the Wicked, Good is added to Evil; In ordering Impunity to the Wicked, Evil is added to Evil. To punish Wickedness is Right, therefore Good: To leave men uncontrolled in their Wickedness, is Unrighteous, and therefore Bad. But again, Shall his Justice in some few Judgments in the World, impeach his Goodness, more than his wonderful Patience to Sinners is able to silence the Calumnies against him? Is not his hand fuller of gracious Doles, than of dreadful Thunderbolts? Doth he not oftener seem forgetful of his Justice, when he pours out upon the guilty the Streams of his Mercy, than to be forgetful of his Goodness, when he sprinkles in the World some drops of his Wrath?

6. The severe Punishment of Offenders, and the Afflictions he inflicts upon his Servants, are no violations of his Goodness. The Notion of Gods Vindictive Justice is as naturally inbred, and implanted in the mind of Man, as that of his Goodness, and those two Sentiments never shockt one another. The Heathen never thought him bad because he was just, nor unrighteous because he was good. God being Infinitely good, cannot possibly intend or act any thing but what is good: Thou art good, and thou dost good, i. e. whatsoever thou dost is good, whatsoever it be, pleasant or painful to the Creature:^* Punishments themselves are not a Moral Evil in the Person that inflicts, though they are a Natural Evil in the Person that suffers them.^†