A32723:2919
Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God
Several discourses upon the existence and attributes of God by that late eminent minister in Christ, Mr. Stephen Charnocke ...
London: printed for D. Newman, 1682
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2. It ought therefore to render him amiable to us. What renders him lovely to his own Eye, ought to render him so to ours; and since by the shortness of our Understandings we cannot love him, as he Merits, yet we should be induced by the measures of his Bounty, to love him, as we can. If this do not present him lovely to us, we own him rather a Devil than a God: If his Goodness moved him to frame Creatures, his Goodness moved him also to frame Creatures for himself, and his own glory. 'Tis a mighty wrong to him, not to look with a delightful Eye upon the Marks of it, and return an Affection to God in some measure suitable to his liberality to us; We are descended as low as Brutes, if we understand him not to be the Perfect Good; and we are descended as low as Devils, if our Affections are not attracted by it.
2. It ought therefore to render him amiable to us. What renders him lovely to his own Eye, ought to render him so to ours; and since by the shortness of our Understandings we cannot love him, as he Merits, yet we should be induc'd by the measures of his Bounty, to love him, as we can. If this do not present him lovely to us, we own him rather a Devil than a God: If his Goodness moved him to frame Creatures, his Goodness moved him also to frame Creatures for himself, and his own glory. 'Tis a mighty wrong to him, not to look with a delightful Eye upon the Marks of it, and return an Affection to God in some measure sutable to his liberality to us; We are descended as low as Brutes, if we understand him not to be the Perfect Good; and we are descended as low as Devils, if our Affections are not attracted by it.
1. If God were not Infinitely Good, he could not be the Object of Supreme Love. If he were Finitely Good, there might be other things as good as God, and then God in justice could not challenge our choicest Affections to him, above any thing else: It would be a defect of goodness in him, to demand it, because he would despoil that, which were equally good with him, of its due and right to our affections, which it might claim from us upon the account of its goodness: God would be unjust to challenge more than was due to him; for he would claim that chiefly to himself, which another had a lawful share in. Nothing can be supremely loved, that hath not a Triumphant Excellency above all other things: Where there is an equality of goodness, neither can justly challenge a Supremacy, but only an equality of Affection.